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ARTICLE
Weak Loyalties: How the Rule of Law Prevents Coups D’État and

Generates Long-Term Political Stability
Ivan Perkins*
ABSTRACT

The “rule of law” is lauded for producing a variety of positive governance characteristics, including
minimal corruption, human rights, and economic prosperity. What has been overlooked, however, is that
rule-of-law institutions are also responsible for another phenomenon: the fact that certain states experience
long-term political stability, without any coups or coup attempts (defined as internal efforts to seize central
state authority through force). The prevailing theory of stability holds that “professional” military officers
refrain from coups because they have internalized the norms of civilian authority and constitutional
procedure. However, this theory requires a system of socialization capable of counteracting self-interest,
throughout the entire political-military establishment, for centuries at a time. By examining the first two
states to achieve long-term stability—the Republic of Venice and Great Britain—this Article develops a new
theory. Impartial rule-of-law institutions systematically attenuate personal-loyalty relationships within the
political-military establishment, and this process inhibits the formation of criminal conspiracies, including
those aiming at a coup d’état. The Article identifies 22 states that experienced zero coups and coup attempts
during the period 1961-2010. Using this data, the Article confirms a prediction of the theory: that stable
states should exhibit low levels of corruption.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In what are called “mature democracies,” people generally take the absence of military coups and other
violent revolutionary upheavals for granted. The prevailing theory of stability holds that “professional”
military organizations train soldiers and commanders to accept civilian supremacy, such that they do not
even consider mounting a coup against the constitutionally-appointed government.1 This theory, however,
requires a stark and surprising negation of self-interest, in that military commanders must always place
constitutional considerations over and above their own desires.2 This anti-coup training must also be
systematic: it must operate throughout the political-military establishment and be effectively transmitted to
succeeding generations.3 This Article contends that the “rule of law” provides a stronger and simpler
explanation for stability. Impartial rule-of-law institutions systematically attenuate personal-loyalty
relationships within the political-military establishment, and this process in turn inhibits the formation of
grand criminal conspiracies, including those aiming at a coup d’état.
As scholars like A.V. Dicey and Joseph Raz have concluded, the “rule of law” is intrinsically
incompatible with governmental corruption, defined as the abuse of public office for personal gain or
favoritism.4 While there is no such thing as a corruption-free state, a state purporting to be under the “rule of
law” must exhibit low corruption levels.5 As some scholars of corruption have noted, corrupt activities like
bribery and nepotism are facilitated by (and help solidify) strong ties based upon kinship and patronage.6 At
a more general level, a substantial body of academic research illustrates the fundamental incompatibility
between impersonal rules and personal loyalties.7 Rule-of-law institutions gradually move society from
insular and exclusive factions, permeated by strong bonds of loyalty and reciprocity, to an open-ended
network society in which individuals form a myriad of temporary combinations, wherein each link is
relatively weak.8
The Article traces this development historically, focusing on the first two states to achieve long-term
political stability: Venice and Great Britain. During the Renaissance and Early Modern periods, the Venetian
Republic was famous for its exceptional stability. Venice experienced no coups or coup attempts, defined as
an internal effort to seize central state authority through physical force, from 1355 until Napoleon’s conquest
of the city-state in 1797.9 Great Britain has achieved similar stability since 1746, when the last serious
1
2
3
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9

See infra notes 224–237 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 238-248 and accompanying text.
Id.
Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in LIBERTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 3, 12 (Robert L. Cunningham ed., 1979) (“The
arbitrary use of governmental power for personal gain, out of vengeance or favoritism . . . is drastically restricted by close
adherence to the rule of law.”); ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 189
(10th ed. 1959) (“[T]he law in England ensures that every official, from the Prime Minister down to a constable or a collector
of taxes, is under the same responsibility for every act done without legal justification as any other citizen.”); Thomas
Carothers, The Rule-of-Law Revival, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 3, 4 (Thomas
Carothers ed., 2006) (“Respect for the law will not easily take root in systems rife with corruption and cynicism, since
entrenched elites cede their traditional impunity and vested interests only under great pressure.”).
Carothers, supra note 4, at 4 (explaining that in order for “rule of law reform” to be successful, laws must apply equally to
everyone, political leaders must be willing to abide by these laws, and central lawmaking institutions must be fair and
efficient).
ERIC M. USLANER, CORRUPTION, INEQUALITY, AND THE RULE OF LAW 49–50 (2008); see also Johann Graf Lambsdorff, What
Nurtures Corrupt Deals? On the Role of Confidence and Transaction Costs, in CORRUPT EXCHANGES: EMPIRICAL THEMES IN
POLITICS AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION 20, 20–36 (Donatella Della Porta & Susan Rose-Ackerman eds.,
2002) (explaining that certain social structures allow corruption to thrive based on the advantage and “kinship” of group
members).
See infra note 344 and accompanying text.
Id.
See infra notes 24–73 and accompanying text.
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attempt to topple the British state was defeated.10 Renaissance Venice was also renowned for its
exceptionally fair and impartial legal system,11 and eighteenth-century Britain enjoyed a similar reputation.12
Chronologically, therefore, mature rule-of-law institutions coincide with the onset of stability in both states.
The Article shows that personal-loyalty relationships weakened with the development of rule-of-law
institutions in both Venice and Britain.13
The attenuation of personal-loyalty relationships generates long-term political stability because, in the
absence of tightly-knit cliques and cabals, the formation of a grand conspiracy to seize state power becomes
inordinately difficult. Scholars of corruption have pointed out that “corruption networks” tend to be based
upon family, clan, tribal, and patronage bonds;14 similarly, scholars of the coup d’état have noted that coup
organizers tend to draw upon the same “strong-tie” links to recruit followers.15 This is because any criminal
endeavor—and especially a coup, which is a complex operation requiring the participation of hundreds of
individuals—brings the risk of discovery and criminal punishment. As a result, conspirators turn to people
they can trust.16 Even in rule-of-law states with attenuated personal loyalties, of course, some corrupt
activities occur within the political-military establishment.17 For example, politicians, civil servants, and
military commanders can be susceptible to the temptations of bribery—a crime that may only involve two
people and can remain forever secret. Balancing risks and rewards, it may be individually rational to offer or
accept a bribe. But the risk/reward calculations change with respect to a coup d’état, where hundreds of
individuals must participate in an operation that becomes public at the moment of execution. In a rule-of-law
society, a coup organizer would have to approach hundreds of fellow military officers, bureaucrats, or
politicians—with whom he or she would only be connected through “weak ties”—and any one of them
could betray the plot, perhaps for personal gain. In this context, it becomes highly irrational (from an
individual’s perspective) to approach even one other person about a coup d’état. In short, the rule of law
creates a “collective action problem” that renders coup conspiracies untenable. In mature democracies like
Britain and the United States, it is the rule of law that inhibits any threat of a coup d’état.
If the theory above is correct, we would expect to find that stable states exhibit minimal corruption. By
examining every state in the world between 1961 and 2010 to determine whether it experienced any coups or
serious coup attempts, the Article identifies 22 states that were “coup-free” during this period.18 It compares
this set of 22 states with data on relative corruption rates and finds a statistically significant correlation
between stability and low corruption. Almost all of the 22 “coup-free” states appear at the very bottom of
corruption indexes, showing that they are the cleanest, least corrupt, and most rule-of-law based
governments in the world.19
“Coup” is defined broadly here, as any forceful seizure of central government power by internal
actors.20 A coup or coup d’état is any disorderly, unpredictable transfer of power, accomplished through
10
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20

See infra notes 81–135 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 250–343 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 251–343 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 344–440 and accompanying text.
See USLANER, supra note 6, at 49–50 (describing how corruption is based on trust, and trust is best fostered among one’s “own
kind” or “small circle”); see also Lambsdorff, supra note 7 (noting that corruption often occurs among those in the same
ethnicity, cultural group, or those sharing “kinship ties”).
EDWARD LUTTWAK, COUP D’ÉTAT: A PRACTICAL HANDBOOK 74–75 (1979) (finding recruitment usually based upon “family,
clan and ethnic links”); see BRUCE W. FARCAU, THE COUP: TACTICS IN THE SEIZURE OF POWER 38 (1994) (citing factional
loyalties to charismatic military officers as key factors in the origin of coups); see also SAMUEL DECALO, COUPS AND ARMY
RULE IN AFRICA: MOTIVATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS 6, 288 (2nd ed. 1990) (describing a typical coup-prone African army as a
coterie of “distinct armed camps” and “personal-loyalty pyramids,” where soldiers owe personal allegiance to their
commanders).
USLANER, supra note 6, at 49–50.
See, e.g., infra notes 321-325 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 136–157 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 490-492 and accompanying text; see Table, “Corruption Levels and the Coup-Free Zone,” p. 79.
See infra notes 445-453 and accompanying text.
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physical force or intimidation.21 This includes a coup d’état by military commanders, but also encompasses,
for example, palace intrigue.22 When one brother kills or imprisons another, and assumes his throne, he
commits a coup. The definition extends to long civil wars for power, like that waged between Marc Antony,
Octavian, and the assassins of Julius Caesar, as well as to spontaneous street revolutions, like those in
Tehran in 1979, Manila in 1986, Eastern European capitals in 1989, Belgrade in 2000, Bishkek in 2010, and
Tunis and Cairo in 2011. The effort to seize power need not succeed; serious but failed attempts still count.
Finally, the term “coup” embraces an “executive coup,” whereby a constitutional leader radically and
forcefully extends his scope of power or term of service, in violation of the constitution, as in Chancellor
Hitler’s 1933 hijacking of Germany with Nazi thugs.
This definition of “coup” excludes purely secessionist rebellions, where one region simply tries to
leave a larger state. These appear throughout history, and include local uprisings against the Roman, Persian,
and Chinese empires, the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny in India, the U.S. Civil War, and recent conflicts in Bosnia,
East Timor, and Chechnya. Such events, we should note, are compatible with central stability. Even as the
American Revolution, Sepoy Mutiny, Boer rebellions, Irish uprisings, and anti-colonial movements racked
the British Empire, for example, constitutional succession in Westminster remained placid and procedural.
Such orderly, peaceful politics is our focus.
The Article proceeds in the following steps. Part I identifies a set of states that have entered long-term
stability. First, it examines the first two states to effectively banish coups from their politics: the Republic of
Venice and Great Britain. Second, it presents empirical research demonstrating that, between 1961 and
2010, only 22 independent states (including Britain) experienced no coups or coup attempts. Together, this
historical and contemporary research establishes a list of 23 “coup-free states.”
Part II explores the explanations for stability that have been proposed to date. It examines the specific
explanations for Venetian and British stability, as well as the prevailing theory of stability with respect to
today’s “mature democracies.” Explicitly or implicitly, many of these theories rely on the concept of
“virtue,” which holds that people could commit coups, but refrain because of ethical inhibitions. This notion
places a heavy burden on training or socialization, requiring it to negate basic self-interest for decades or
centuries at a time, without really explaining how it accomplishes this task.
Next, the Article searches for a better theory. It begins by asking whether Venice and Britain shared
any characteristics that might explain their remarkable stability. As Part III demonstrates, both states
developed the “rule of law,” with legal institutions renowned for fairness, impartiality, and dependability.
Specifically, each state developed a legal system that exhibited the following eight characteristics: (1)
equality under the law; (2) rational inquiry; (3) public adversarial debates; (4) procedural protections for
criminal defendants; (5) a legal profession closely intertwined with political elites; (6) an independent
judiciary; (7) the systematic subjection of state actions to legal scrutiny; and (8) low governmental
corruption.
Part IV elucidates how, in both Venice and Britain, rule-of-law institutions gradually attenuated personal
loyalties rooted in family, clan, lordship, and patronage. This process was partly intentional: both states
promulgated specific laws designed to weaken the relationships between noble families and their followers.
Finally, Part V presents a new theory of stability, which applies to Venice, Britain, and the other
contemporary “coup-free states.” Rule-of-law institutions, by systematically attenuating personal-loyalty
relationships within the government and military, inhibit the formation of criminal conspiracies, including
those aiming at a coup d’état. Using a statistical test, Part V confirms a basic prediction of the theory: that
coup-free states should exhibit minimal corruption.
In essence, high-ranking officials under the rule of law do not trust each other enough to conspire in a
coup d’état. In fact, as anecdotal evidence suggests, they cannot even propose a coup in casual conversation,
because their interlocutors are more likely to report the incident, rather than to go along. In this context,
21
22

Id.
See id.
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merely mentioning a coup with any degree of seriousness becomes far too risky, and the notion effectively
disappears from national political life.

II.

THE HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY “COUP-FREE STATES”
A. VENICE AND BRITAIN

In the late fourteenth century, the oligarchic republic of Venice gained renown for its lawful, orderly,
and non-violent politics.23 Four hundred years later, Great Britain acquired a similar reputation.24 These
states built entirely different constitutional orders, but each managed to avoid coups and coup attempts for
centuries on end.

1. La Serenissima Repubblica: “The Most Serene Republic”
Venice was not always tranquil. The seventh and eighth centuries saw chronic strife, and there were
coups and coup attempts in 804, 836, 864, 946, 976, 1022-23, 1024, 1032, 1082, and 1172.25 But following a
final coup attempt in 131026 and a major conspiracy in 1355,27 no Venetians attempted to overthrow their
government.28 The republic lasted until 1797, when it was invaded by Napoleon, and lost its independence.29
Venice was known as La Serenissima Repubblica—“The Most Serene Republic”—and several historians
call it the first state to emerge from internecine violence.30
For centuries, Europeans hailed the Adriatic marvel. The republic “does not know civil discord,” wrote
a fifteenth-century French scholar.31 A sixteenth-century philosopher noted that there were no civil wars or
tyrants there.32 An Englishman proclaimed Venice free from “intestin commotions and tumults.”33 As a
23

24

25
26
27
28

29
30

31
32

See, e.g., John Martin & Dennis Romano, Reconsidering Venice, in VENICE RECONSIDERED: THE HISTORY AND CIVILIZATION
OF AN ITALIAN CITY-STATE 1297-1797 1, 2 (John Martin & Dennis Romano eds., 2000) (noting that due to the city’s unique
stability during the Renaissance, “Venice appeared to be a city like no other”); WILLIAM J. BOUWSMA, VENICE AND THE
DEFENSE OF REPUBLICAN LIBERTY: RENAISSANCE VALUES IN THE AGE OF THE COUNTER REFORMATION 63 (1968) (“Venice
had been celebrated . . . as a paragon of domestic tranquility” by the 1400s); JOHN JULIUS NORWICH, A HISTORY OF VENICE
277 (1985) (quoting James Harrington’s 1656 The Common-Wealth of Oceana: “[T]here never happened unto any other
Common-wealth, so undisturbed and constant a tranquility and peace in her self, as is that of Venice.”).
See generally IAN GILMOUR, RIOT, RISINGS AND REVOLUTION: GOVERNANCE AND VIOLENCE IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
ENGLAND (1992); SIR DAVID LINDSAY KEIR, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN SINCE 1485 (8th ed. 1966);
MALCOLM I. THOMIS & PETER HOLT, THREATS OF REVOLUTION IN BRITAIN, 1789-1848 (1977).
NORWICH, supra note 23, at 1–12, 19, 31, 34, 40, 42, 62–63, 73, 106.
AUBREY FEIST, THE LION OF ST MARK: VENICE: THE STORY OF A CITY FROM ATTILA TO NAPOLEON 109–13 (1971); 1 W.
CAREW HAZLITT, THE VENETIAN REPUBLIC: ITS RISE, ITS GROWTH, AND ITS FALL, A.D. 409-1797 544–47 (1915).
1 HAZLITT, supra note 26, at 623–38; see also 1 HORATIO F. BROWN, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF VENICE 92–94 (Hazel,
Watson, & Viney LD. 1907) (describing the plan of the conspirators).
FREDERIC C. LANE, VENICE: A MARITIME REPUBLIC 271 (1973) (“The devices for the restraint of faction woven into the
machinery of government were sufficiently successful so that none of the men disappointed in the intense competition for
honors tried to overthrow the system, at least none after Marino Falier [in 1355].”); see also ROBERT FINLAY, POLITICS IN
RENAISSANCE VENICE 288 (1980) (“[T]he patrician republic gave Venice five hundred years of domestic peace and stability.
Violence was kept from politics.”).
2 W. CAREW HAZLITT, THE VENETIAN REPUBLIC: ITS RISE, ITS GROWTH, AND ITS FALL, A.D. 409-1797 302–04 (AMS Press
1915).
LANE, supra note 28, at 252; 2 HAZLITT, supra note 29, at 479–80 (noting that Venice was the “first European Power” to
emerge “from its civil and internecine struggles”); WILLIAM ROSCOE THAYER, A SHORT HISTORY OF VENICE ix–x (1905)
(commenting that Venice was “singularly free” from “internal rebellion,” “dynastic or class rivalry,” and “military ambition”);
FINLAY, supra note 28, at 288 (explaining that Venice had been able to overcome problems that other political communities
could not).
PHILIP LONGWORTH, THE RISE AND FALL OF VENICE 175 (1974) (quoting Philippe de Commynes).
MARION LEATHERS KUNTZ, The Myth of Venice in the Thought of Guillaume Postel, in VENICE, MYTH AND UTOPIAN
THOUGHT IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY: BODIN, POSTEL AND THE VIRGIN OF VENICE 507 (1999) (citing Jean Bodin).
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Dutchman commented, the patricians “established themselves so well in their authority” after the conspiracy
of 1355 that they faced no rebellions within the city.34 The Enlightenment-era Encyclopédie lauded Venice
for “an internal tranquility that has never altered.”35
Venetians themselves branded their state a glorious exception.36 A local booster, for example,
exaggerated his city’s record in a 1544 book. “In our city,” he claimed, “no popular tumult or sedition has
ever occurred.”37 This was inaccurate, but nearly two centuries had passed since the 1355 plot was quashed,
and faith in Venetian stability was growing unshakable.38 We are “so well established,” a Venetian
ambassador told the King of Spain in 1571, “our succession is of a kind which can never fail.”39
Through the years, a horde of commentators called Venice perfect.40 “It seems a heroic accomplishment
and more than human, indeed celestial and divine,” exclaimed one, “to remain so many centuries, without
change, in the same state.”41 A humanist called Venice “the most perfect magistracy” because it remained stable,
even as other princes and governments fell amidst “cruelty, violence, and ambition.”42
Many expected the perfect government to last forever.43 A mercenary preferred to serve Venice over
Milan, he said, because “the Duke of Milan was mortal, but Venice would never die.”44 If anything human
could be “perpetual and eternal,” said one chronicler, it would be Venice.45 “This holy republic,” wrote a
Renaissance diarist, “has neither popular sedition nor discord among her patricians, but all unite in
promoting her greatness; and therefore, as wise men say, she will live forever.”46 A politician predicted his
city’s concord would last “until the end of time.”47 “Could any State on Earth Immortall be,” rhymed a
seventeenth-century Englishman, “Venice by Her rare Government is she.”48
33
34
35
36
37
38

39
40

41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

William Bouwsma, Venice and the Political Education of Europe, in RENAISSANCE VENICE 445, 454 (J.R. Hale ed., 1973)
(quoting James Howell).
ECO O.G. HAITSMA MULIER, THE MYTH OF VENICE AND DUTCH REPUBLICAN THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 151
(Gerard T. Moran trans., Van Gorcom 1980) (quoting Pieter De la Court).
Bouwsma, Venice and the Political Education of Europe, supra note 34, at 455.
GARRY WILLS, VENICE: LION CITY 367–68 (2001).
Bouwsma, Venice and the Political Education of Europe, supra note 33, at 448.
BOUWSMA, VENICE AND THE DEFENSE OF REPUBLICAN LIBERTY, supra note 23, at 162 (“The myth that Venice ideally
combined freedom and order and was therefore durable beyond any polity previously known to man stimulated the European
imagination for almost three centuries.”).
Alberto Tenenti, The Sense of Space and Time in the Venetian World of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, in
RENAISSANCE VENICE 17, 34 (J.R. Hale ed., 1973).
E.g., NORWICH, supra note 23, at 277 (quoting James Harrington’s 1656 The Common-Wealth of Oceana: “that perfection, which, as
to the civil part, hath no pattern in the universal World, but this of Venice”); LONGWORTH, supra note 31, at 214 (noting that the
“myth of the Republic” circulating during the Renaissance presented the republic and its constitution as “uniquely perfect”); FINLAY,
supra note 28, at 1 (“As early as the fifteenth century, Venice was renowned for its political stability and civic harmony, and even as
late as the eighteenth century it was widely believed that Venetians had discovered the secret of a perfect constitution…”); ZERA S.
FINK, THE CLASSICAL REPUBLICANS: AN ESSAY IN THE RECOVERY OF A PATTERN OF THOUGHT IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
ENGLAND 35 (1945) (noting that Venice appeared “the supreme example” of mixed government to Renaissance theorists);
BOUWSMA, VENICE AND THE DEFENSE OF REPUBLICAN LIBERTY, supra note 23, at 160 (“Her [Venice’s] good order and her survival
seemed unimpeachable evidence of perfection in a world where all else were swirling flux.”); THAYER, supra note 30, at 225 (“We
may say of the Venetian oligarchy that as a working system it came nearer to perfection than any other form of government has
come.”).
BOUWSMA, VENICE AND THE DEFENSE OF REPUBLICAN LIBERTY, supra note 23, at 162.
KUNTZ, supra note 32, at 510–11 (quoting Guillaume Postel).
E.g., FINLAY, supra note 28, at 32 (“[V]enice was thought to have achieved constitutional immortality.”).
Michael Mallett, Venice and its Condottieri, 1404-54, in RENAISSANCE VENICE 121, 127–28 (J.R. Hale ed., 1973).
BOUWSMA, VENICE AND THE DEFENSE OF REPUBLICAN LIBERTY, supra note 23, at 90 (quoting Marcantonio Sabellico).
Id. at 63 (quoting Marin Sanuto).
LONGWORTH, supra note 31, at 197 (quoting the sixteenth-century reformer Bartolommeo Moro).
JOHN EGLIN, VENICE TRANSFIGURED: THE MYTH OF VENICE IN BRITISH CULTURE, 1660-1797 15–16 (2001) (quoting James
Howell). See also EDWARD MUIR, CIVIC RITUAL IN RENAISSANCE VENICE 53 (1981) (quoting James Howell who argued that
England should emulate Venetian institutions, because if it were possible to establish “a Society and Succession of people
under the same Species of Government as long as the World lasts,” the Venetian Republic provided the best model for
imitation).
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Even if Venice wasn’t “perfect,” some declared it the best state ever created.49 One heralded “the most
beautiful and best government that any city, not only in our times but also the classical world, ever
possessed.”50 “This city,” crowed a noble Venetian, “is administered as well as any city in the whole world
ever was or will be.”51
Mechanical metaphors proliferated. Seventeenth-century writers called the republic a “great and
ingenious machine,”52 and “a clock going with many wheels and making small motions, sometimes out of
order, but soon mended, all without change or variety.”53 For some, the clockwork state was dull! “The
history of the Venetians flows on without being marked by any events worthy of the attention of posterity,”
complained a French historian.54
Of course, Venice was never completely uneventful, but nothing after 1310 amounted to an overt coup
attempt, and few events after 1355 even came close.55 Doge Lorenzo Celsi was accused of overreaching his
powers in the 1360s, but died before an investigation got under way, and was posthumously exonerated.56 In
1372 and 1406, the Council of Ten, a secretive body charged with overseeing state security, discovered plots
orchestrated by the Lord of Padua, whereby his paid Venetian turncoats prepared to assassinate anti-Paduan
politicians.57 Both times, the Ten acted quickly, and executed the traitors.58 A coup conspiracy between two
rich commoners in 1413 lasted only a few hours, before one turned in the other.59
In 1456, following his son’s death, an aging Doge Francesco Foscari secluded himself in his apartment
and withdrew from official duties.60 After a year and a half, the Council of Ten and the Ducal Councilors
asked him to step down.61 Foscari initially complained that the request was illegal,62 but when the officials
insisted, the Doge resigned without a fight.63 This was probably a deviation from strict constitutional
propriety, since only the Great Council could remove a doge, but the episode hardly resembles a seizure of
power. There was no threat of violence, the councilors were in full control from the beginning, and they
immediately elected a new doge through established procedures.64
In 1618, the city faced a threat that straddled the boundary between local intrigue and foreign
aggression. French mercenaries, recently employed by the republic, gathered in Venetian taverns.65 They
49

50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

E.g., Felix Gilbert, The Venetian Constitution in Florentine Political Thought, in FLORENTINE STUDIES: POLITICS AND
SOCIETY IN RENAISSANCE FLORENCE 463, 476 (Nicolai Rubinstein ed., 1968) (citing Marcantonio Sabellico’s view that
Venice “excelled all states that had ever existed”); BOUWSMA, VENICE AND THE DEFENSE OF REPUBLICAN LIBERTY, supra note
23, at 626 (citing Pierre D’Avity, a seventeenth-century Frenchman, who held the Venetian government superior to all others
known to man); Bouwsma, Venice and the Political Education of Europe, supra note 33, at 454 (quoting Claude de Seyssel,
who called Venice the “most perfect and best administered empire and state of community that one has seen or read of up to
now”).
Gilbert, supra note 49, at 487 (quoting Francesco Guicciardini, a sixteenth-century Florentine).
PATRICIA H. LABALME & LAURA SANGUINETI WHITE, VENICE, CITÀ EXCELENTISSIMA: SELECTIONS FROM THE RENAISSANCE
DIARIES OF MARIN SANUDO 84 (Linda L. Carroll trans., 2008).
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WILLS, supra note 36, at 73 (quoting Sir Dudley Carleton, the British Ambassador to Venice).
NORWICH, supra note 23, at 459–60.
See supra notes 23–30 and accompanying text.
1 HAZLITT, supra note 26, at 670–71.
NORWICH, supra note 23, at 241, 268.
Id.
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Id. at 980.
Id. 980–982 (detailing the contents of the motion asking the Doge to resign).
Id. at 982 (“Foscari . . . replied at considerable length . . . intimating that the course adopted was at variance with the
Constitution . . . .”).
Id. at 983.
H.R. Trevor-Roper, Doge Francesco Foscari, in THE ITALIAN RENAISSANCE 263–67 (J.H. Plumb ed., 2001); 2 HAZLITT, supra
note 29, at 966–86.
Richard Mackenney, A Plot Discover’d? Myth, Legend, and the “Spanish” Conspiracy against Venice in 1618, in VENICE
RECONSIDERED: THE HISTORY AND CIVILIZATION OF AN ITALIAN CITY-STATE 1297-1797, at 195 (John Martin & Dennis
Romano eds., 2000).
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talked, perhaps too carelessly, about slaughtering the Great Council, seizing the Piazza San Marco, and
plundering the opulent palaces.66 Supposedly, the Spanish Viceroy in Naples sponsored the plan—which
was dubbed the “Spanish Conspiracy”—but the evidence is ambiguous.67 In any case, nothing happened,
except that one morning three mercenary leaders were found dangling from a gibbet.68 According to some
reports, the Ten quietly executed 300 men.69 Survivors fled. Even if we call this a “coup plot,” because the
participants were Venetian hirelings, it never flowered into an overt revolutionary attempt.70
Venetian authorities treated some reformers as deeply subversive, even when they merely sought
peaceful, incremental change. Noble politicians seeking to trim the powers of the Council of Ten found
themselves banished, imprisoned, or placed under house arrest in 1625, 1628, 1741, 1756, and 1761.71 In
1780, a nobleman named Giorgio Pisani argued for equalizing power and wealth within the noble caste. He,
too, went to jail. Opponents alleged that Pisani conspired to overthrow the government, but this is
impossible to confirm.72 In any case, no revolution materialized.

2. British Stability
Like Venice, England was not always stable. King Richard II, held in the Tower of London after the
coup of 1399, lamented his “fickle” realm, “which hath exiled, slain, destroyed, or ruined so many kings,
rulers and great men, and is ever tainted and toileth with strife and variance and envy.”73 The next two
centuries saw coup attempts in 1403, 1408, 1414, 1450, 1464, 1483, 1487, 1497, 1554, and 1569, successful
coups in 1455, 1456, 1483, 1485, and 1549, two coups in 1469 and 1553, and periods of civil war in 145961 and 1470-71.74 Volatility persisted through the 1600s: a coup attempt in 1601,75 a period of coups, civil
wars, and coup attempts lasting from 1642 to 1660,76 a quashed rebellion in 1685,77 and a successful
revolution in 168878 dotted the century. After 1688, the ousted Stuart dynasty continually conspired with
66
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murder of 300 men).
See NORWICH, supra note 23, at 525 (noting that the leaders of the plot were too powerful to be harmed but that their plan
failed and “Venice was preserved”).
See ALETHEA WIEL, VENICE 407–10 (2nd ed. 1894) (illustrating the banishment of one particular protestor named Zeno);
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69, 473–76 (explaining the acts of Zeno, for which he was banished); see also LONGWORTH, supra note 31, at 284 (describing
three other men who were imprisoned or put on house arrest for their protests).
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government); see also LONGWORTH, supra note 31, at 284 (commenting that when he was arrested, Pisani “threatened to
overthrow the ruling clique”).
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2002).
See CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 134 (1956)
(describing the 1601 coup attempt).
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foreign sponsors and British friends, who were known as “Jacobites.”79 The Jacobites mounted serious
rebellions in 1715 and 1745, but their realistic hopes died at Culloden Field in April 1746.80
Since 1746, Britain has seen two and a half centuries of legal and orderly transitions from one
governing ministry to the next.81 This was new. Before 1688, writes an eminent Cambridge don, “the
country had scarcely been free from turbulence for more than a decade at a time.”82 As many people saw it,
England stabilized after 1688; only the Scots remained turbulent. Both major Jacobite risings broke out in
Scotland, as England remained quiet.83 Despite lingering Jacobite sympathies, no English Tories joined the
1745-46 rebellion.84 Historians call 1688 the “last English revolution,”85 and contend that no genuine
revolutionary situations arose in England or Wales after 1689.86
Politics became unusually nonviolent in eighteenth-century England. No politicians were assassinated.87
Ministers who fell from power—at least after 1716—were not threatened.88 Except in duels, politicians no longer
tried to kill opponents.89 After the post-1746 executions, no political offenders paid with their lives.90 Even
impeachment fell into disuse.91 At the time, Englishmen noticed the change. Bereft of violent or treasonous
undercurrents, Parliament could be downright boring. One critic’s caustic remark on the Commons: “A bird
might build her nest in the Speaker’s chair, or in his peruke (wig). There won’t be a debate that can disturb
her.”92 Under the “mild and just” Hanoverian dynasty, Prime Minister William Pitt commented in 1792, “a
general calm has prevailed through the country, beyond what was ever before experienced.”93
Since 1746, there has been occasional revolutionary talk and conspiracy. No domestic activities,
however, have risen to the level of a serious, overt, highly plausible attempt to oust British leaders by
force.94
In the late eighteenth century, many Britons sought a political overhaul. Some reformers became
radicals; some radicals dabbled in revolutionary notions. In the 1760s, Member of Parliament John Wilkes
pressed for democratic reforms and “liberty,” and his supporters formed unruly mobs. Neither he nor his
followers, however, demonstrated revolutionary inclinations.95 The army decisively quelled the “Gordon
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GEOFFREY HOLMES & DANIEL SZECHI, THE AGE OF OLIGARCHY: PRE-INDUSTRIAL BRITAIN, 1722-1783 97 (1993) (noting the
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Id. at 330 (“Jacobite hopes were not finally extinguished, realistically, until they lay amid the carnage on Culloden’s field in
1746.”); see also FRANK MCLYNN, THE JACOBITES 19 (1985) (arguing that 1746 “ended for all time, though of course no one
at the time realized it, all armed attempts to restore the Stuart dynasty to the three kingdoms”).
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THOMIS & HOLT, supra note 24, at 126–33 (noting that the period 1789-1848 was the time “when Britain came nearest in
modern times to experiencing revolution,” but arguing that no revolutionary movements or plans came close to success, even
during this relatively difficult period).
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TREVELYAN, supra note 77, at 381 (“In 1715 and again in 1745 there were Jacobite rebellions very formidable in Scotland,
though they failed to elicit serious support in England.”).
GILMOUR, supra note 24, at 116 (noting that “[n]o prominent Tory did anything at all” in the ’45 rebellion).
Id. at 7–8.
CHARLES TILLY, CONTENTION AND DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE, 1650-2000 133-67 (2004).
GILMOUR, supra note 24, at 5.
Id. at 98.
Id. at 41.
KEIR, supra note 24, at 289–90.
Id.
HOLMES & SZECHI, supra note 79, at 267 (quoting Horace Walpole on the 1746-54 period).
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Riots” of 1780.96 There was a constitutional standoff between the Crown and leading politicians in 1782-84,
but violence remained remote and implausible.97
The 1789 French Revolution inspired radicals across the Channel. In 1793, agitators were prosecuted
for seeking to assemble a “National Convention” in Edinburgh as a rival to Parliament.98 Rioting erupted in
October 1795, and two naval mutinies—mostly over sailors’ pay and conditions—broke out in 1797.99 On
the whole, however, French-inspired plotting proved ineffective. Government spies consistently infiltrated
subversive cabals.100 Unlike many Continental states, England had no sizeable contingent of émigrés—or
local “Fifth Column”—ready to collaborate with the aggressive French “crusade for universal liberty.”101
Most reformers sought incremental change from within.102 In any case, there were no serious attempts to
seize power through force.103
The 1810s witnessed another wave of popular radicalism and conspiracy. “Luddites” rioted in
northern England, destroying new-fangled machines.104 Poor harvests brought food riots, as well as
alarming instances of military-style drilling, oath-taking, and attacks on arms depots by local groups.105
There were a few revolutionary actions—but none can be counted serious threats to established order.106
In 1816, a small cabal of militants looted gunsmiths’ shops and attacked the Tower of London. They were
easily repulsed.107 Radicals planned a national uprising for June 1817. A government agent informed the
authorities, who preemptively arrested the ringleaders.108 The only men to rise were about 300 workers
from Pentridge; they were apprehended without trouble, and three of their leaders were hanged and
beheaded.109 A revolutionary named Arthur Thistlewood concocted an extravagant plan—dubbed the
“Cato Street Conspiracy”—to blow up Prime Minister Lord Liverpool and his entire Cabinet as they dined
in February 1820.110 Thistlewood assumed the assassinations would trigger a national uprising; he
intended to form a provisional government. But Thistlewood’s aide-de-camp, George Edwards, was a
government agent—and the “Cabinet dinner” was a ruse anyway.111 Police arrested the conspirators;
Thistlewood and four confederates were hanged.112
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make the Commons more democratic); see also EVANS, supra note 100, at 69 (describing 1790s activists as largely illprepared for “any struggle which spread beyond the comfortable limits of the printed pamphlet or the discussion group”); see
also THOMIS & HOLT, supra note 24, at 1–2 (explaining that central to this period of time was the idea of parliamentary
reform).
GILMOUR, supra note 24, at 442–43 (no “revolutionary situation or opportunity” arose from 1780 to 1800).
LYON, supra note 98, at 316.
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EVANS, supra note 100, at 195–96 (describing the authorities’ “ability to nip trouble in the bud” with “bevies of informers who
penetrated supposedly secret radical committees with ease”); THOMIS & HOLT, supra note 24, at 46–49 (neither the Pentridge
Rebellion nor the Cato Street Conspiracy “came near to success,” and authorities calculated that activities “might safely be
allowed to proceed without serious threat to the public safety”).
EVANS, supra note 100, at 193–94; LYON, supra note 98, at 317.
THOMIS & HOLT, supra note 24, at 46–47.
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The last revolutionary alarms sounded in the 1830s and 1840s. Middle-class and working-class
reformers struggled to make the oligarchic Parliament more representative of the nation. They wanted to
expand the franchise, and eliminate the “rotten boroughs” usually dominated by aristocratic patrons.113
Two moments of high tension culminated in the landmark 1832 Reform Act. In October 1831, the
House of Lords defeated the government’s reform bill.114 Rioting erupted in various cities; a mob held
Bristol for three days. The following May, the Lords again blocked reform.115 Mass demonstrations and
riots followed, and rumors swarmed of insurrection.116 The Birmingham Political Union—with an army
of 1500 men and muskets, at least on paper—pledged itself to an uprising, if necessary.117 It proved
unnecessary. In the face of disorder, reform passed. Earl Grey, the Prime Minister, argued reform would
“prevent the necessity for revolution.”118 King William IV pressured reluctant Tory Lords, and the
Reform Act became law.119 “Rotten boroughs” lost seats in Parliament, cities gained them, and the
franchise widened.120 Now, one in five men could vote.121
Still, working classes remained dissatisfied. “Chartists,” who supported a written constitutional charter,
pressed for universal male suffrage, equal representation in Parliament, payment of MPs, and vote by secret
ballot—in short, for democracy.122 Chartists mounted serious demonstrations, riots, and strikes between
1838 and 1848, as militants urged their followers to “arm, arm, arm.”123 Some gatherings displayed weapons
and discharged guns; shadowy coup plots developed.124 No one—including Chartists themselves—knew
whether demonstrations would descend into riots, or whether rioting could bring revolution.125 Chartists
attacked a hotel in Newport in 1838, but soldiers and local authorities chased them away.126 Chartist
violence remained mostly rhetorical. Ultimately, Chartist activities proved less menacing than the
disturbances of 1831-32.127 The movement dissipated after 1848—but its goals were largely implemented by
1900.
Popular revolutions toppled governments across the Continent during the 1830s and 1840s.128 In
Britain, revolutionary talk was primarily tactical, designed to leverage fear into political gain.129 In 1832 at
least, the bluff worked. After 1848, even militant language went into decline. As workers won rights,
prospects for revolt dimmed.130
What about the military? Did any elites—politicians, the Crown, or military commanders—try to
use military force against the constitutional order? In short, were there any attempts at coup d’état after
1688? Scholars agree: there were not. The British military has been well-behaved and solidly
113
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constitutional for over three hundred years.131 From time to time, mere murmurs have sounded. A small
conspiracy formed within one army battalion in 1802-03, but never bloomed.132 During World War One,
Prime Minister Lloyd George feared army commanders were plotting a coup, but this appears
unlikely.133 In 1974, army exercises near Heathrow Airport generated media buzz about a possible coup;
one author found the episode interesting only because “it marked the end of a long period in which the
question had never been raised at all.”134
B. CONTEMPORARY STABILITY: THE 22 COUP-FREE STATES
This Article seeks to identify with precision the set of contemporary “coup-free states,” defined as
those independent states that have experienced no coups or serious coup attempts for a period of at least 50
years. Tracing the histories of all 22 coup-free states, in a manner parallel to the analyses of Venetian and
British history presented here, is outside the scope of this Article. Still, the general chronology can be
presented here.
After Britain came the United States of America135 and Sweden,136 which have maintained
independence and stability for over 200 years. Switzerland has witnessed over 150 years of stability.137
Aside from these four states, the following eighteen states were the only states to remain stable and
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independent from 1961 through 2010: Belgium,138 the Netherlands,139 Luxembourg,140 Norway,141
Denmark,142 Finland,143 Iceland,144 Germany,145 Austria,146 Japan,147 Canada,148 Australia,149 New
Zealand,150 Ireland,151 Israel,152 Mexico,153 Costa Rica,154 and South Africa.155 All other independent states
during this period experienced coups and serious coup attempts.156
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FRANK MCCANN, IRISH POLITICS TODAY (1991); BILL KISSANE, EXPLAINING IRISH DEMOCRACY (2002) (describing Ireland’s
history).
See generally POLICY STUDIES, ISRAEL DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE, NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEMOCRACY IN ISRAEL (Avner
Yaniv ed., 1993) (describing Israeli stability after the nation’s only coup attempt shortly after independence in 1948); See also
YORAM PERI, BETWEEN BATTLES AND BALLOTS: ISRAELI MILITARY IN POLITICS (1983); YEHUDA BEN MEIR, CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS IN ISRAEL (1995) (describing Israeli history).
See generally DAN A. COTHRAN, POLITICAL STABILITY AND DEMOCRACY IN MEXICO: THE ‘PERFECT DICTATORSHIP’? (1994)
FOREIGN AREA STUDIES, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, MEXICO: A COUNTRY STUDY (James D. Rudolph ed., 1985) (explaining the
absence of coups and coup attempts in Mexico since the 1930s).
See generally FOREIGN AREA STUDIES, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, COSTA RICA: A COUNTRY STUDY 57 (Harold D. Nelson ed.,
1983); SETH ROLBEIN, NOBEL COSTA RICA: A TIMELY REPORT ON OUR PEACEFUL PRO-YANKEE, CENTRAL AMERICAN
NEIGHBOR (1989); Philip Mauceri, Nine Cases of Transitions and Consolidations, in DEMOCRACY IN THE AMERICAS:
STOPPING THE PENDULUM (1989) (illustrating the absence of coups and coup attempts in Costa Rica since 1955).
See generally ROBERT M. PRICE, THE APARTHEID STATE IN CRISIS: POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 1975-1990
9-10 (1991); R.W. JOHNSON & LAWRENCE SCHLEMMER, LAUNCHING DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE FIRST OPEN
ELECTION, APRIL 1994 1, 11–12 (1996) (citing the absence of coups and coup attempts (despite revolutionary agitation) in
South Africa since independence in the 1930s).
A total of 96 states maintained their independence from 1961 through 2010 (see “Coups and Corruption” table on page 79 for a
complete list). Information on coups within each of the 74 non-coup-free states, as well as additional information on stability in
the 22 coup-free states, can be found in the following sources: (1) THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (2003); (2) Federal
Research Division, Library of Congress, “Country Studies,” available at http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html#toc; (3) State
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PRIOR EXPLANATIONS OF STABILITY
A. VENICE AND BRITAIN

Separately, scholars of the Venetian Republic and Great Britain have formulated explanations for longterm stability in those states. As we will see, “virtue” has figured prominently in their explanations, as it has in
the prevailing theory of stability within the “mature democracies.” But as section (B) of this part contends, all
virtue-based theories make improbable claims about the power of ethical training to defeat self-interest over
long periods. None of the other proposals—generally involving particular structural features of the Venetian or
British constitutions—are convincing either. The puzzle of lasting constitutional order awaits a solution.

1. Theories of Venetian Serenity
Three main explanations for the constitutional stability of Venice have been floating around since
the Renaissance. They usually appear as short passages; few scholars sat down to build systematic
theories.
First, Venetian patricians were seen as selfless, unassuming, and patriotic public servants.157 We might
call this the “virtue theory.” “[O]ur ancestors were concerned not with ambition and empty fame,” wrote a
Renaissance politician, “but only with the good of their country and the common welfare.”158 Venetians
were thought to eschew narrow, self-interested factions.159 Virtue theory persists: in current lingo, Venice
enjoyed an “internalized conformity to the fundamental demands of the state.”160 In other words, Venetians
believed in playing by the rules.

157

158
159

160

Department Background Notes, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/; (4) EDWARD LUTTWAK, COUP D’ÉTAT: A
PRACTICAL HANDBOOK (1979) (Appendix C); (5) THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 2004 (2004); (6) TIME ALMANAC
2003 (Borgna Brunner ed., 2003); (7) On the 1970 coup attempt in Italy: FRANCO FERRARESI, THREATS TO DEMOCRACY: THE
RADICAL RIGHT IN ITALY AFTER THE WAR 117-20 (1996); FREDERIC SPOTTS & THEODOR WEISER, ITALY: A DIFFICULT
DEMOCRACY 172 (1986); (8) On the 1975 executive coup by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in India: BIPAN CHANDRA, IN THE
NAME OF DEMOCRACY: JP MOVEMENT AND THE EMERGENCY (2003); P.N. DHAR, INDIRA GANDHI, THE ‘EMERGENCY,’ AND
INDIAN DEMOCRACY (2000); KATHERINE FRANK, INDIRA: THE LIFE OF INDIRA NEHRU GANDHI 373-410 (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 2002); (9) On the 1996 coup attempt in North Korea: The Economist, Echoes from the Hermit Kingdom (May
22, 1999); C. Kenneth Quinones, The 2nd US-North Korea Nuclear Crisis – Negotiations or War?, Research Institute of
Economy, Trade & Industry Seminar (July 2, 2003) available at http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/events/bbl/03070201.html, (last visited
September 14, 2008); (10) On the 1987-1988 executive coup in Malaysia: ROBERT STEPHEN MILNE & DIANE K. MAUZY,
MALAYSIAN POLITICS UNDER MAHATHIR 28-30 (1999); (11) On the ambiguous coup attempt in Taiwan in 1964: JAY TAYLOR,
THE GENERALISSIMO’S SON: CHIANG CHING-KUO AND THE REVOLUTIONS IN CHINA AND TAIWAN 270 (2000); (12) On the
ambiguous threat to the North Vietnamese regime posed by rebellions between 1977 and 1983: DOUGLAS PIKE, PAVN: PEOPLE’S
ARMY OF VIETNAM 77-83 (1986).
FINLAY, supra note 28, at 31–32 (noting the widespread perception that “Venetians displayed a moderate and selfless
temperament” and that “[s]elf-interest, the source of grievous sin, constitutional decay, and civic turmoil, was supposedly
absent from Venetian electoral activity and public administration”); Martin & Romano, supra note 23, at 2 (explaining that
humanists depicted Venice as “an ideal republic, a strong maritime empire, and an independent state in which the Venetian
nobles were devoted to the ideals of civic humanism and the commercial virtues of sobriety, hard work, and self-sacrifice”).
FINLAY, supra note 28, at 31.
See James Everett & Donald E. Queller, Family, Faction, and Politics in Early Renaissance Venice, 14 STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL
AND RENAISSANCE HISTORY 1, 1–2 (1993) (“According to the ‘myth’ of Venetian republicanism, the Serenissima’s treasured
political stability and sobriety was assured by the absence of faction. Patricians were to devote themselves to the service of the
state with no thought for their own ambition, let alone the ambition of their clans.”); see also LANE, supra note 28, at 88
(“Another myth which, when fully formed, contributed to the solidarity of the state was a belief that Venice was free of
factions, that all worked together for the glory of their city.”).
BOUWSMA, VENICE AND THE DEFENSE OF REPUBLICAN LIBERTY, supra note 23, at 93.
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Second, humanists credited a “mixed” or “balanced constitution,” a concept harking back to Aristotle.
In this view, the monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic elements—represented by doge, nobility, and
commoners—stood at equipoise. A sturdy architecture blocked each segment from overreaching.161
Third, Venetians themselves believed that justice delivered peace.162 Through a high-quality, equitable,
and impartial judiciary, even poor folk could vindicate their rights.163 “[A]n injury done by a Venetian
gentleman unto the least inhabitant of the city,” commented a Frenchman, “is right severely corrected and
punished.”164 An English observer attributed Venetian harmony to “justice dulie and equallie ministred.”165
None of these theories are quite satisfying. Virtue theory suffers from all the problems discussed
below—essentially, that it expects far too much from the transient human capacity for public-spirited
generosity—as well as from the fact that Venetians were not reliably or unusually virtuous. Modern
historians have easily undermined their lofty image, finding numerous instances of nepotism, bribery,
bias, and vote-selling.166 Stringent bookkeeping methods checked corruption within the city,167 but many
patricians sent to govern overseas territories pumped the locals for cash.168 Baroque anti-cheating
measures infused the electoral system.169 Many Venetians, it seems, broke the rules when they could get
away with it. It strains credulity that pangs of conscience trumped the will to power for half a millennium.
The “balanced constitution” concept is too vague and circular to offer a persuasive account of stability.
What exactly is the correct proportion between monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic parts? What
powers should each segment hold, and how should they interact, to maintain peace? The theory is circular
because the only way to know that a constitution is “balanced” is through evidence of stability. By this logic,
every stable state has a balanced constitution by definition. Moreover, just how “balanced” was Venice
anyway? Only the nobili, constituting roughly 5% of the city, could sit in the Great Council or hold any of
the higher state offices.170 Below them, the cittadini were eligible to hold civil service positions, but this
class constituted only another 5% of the population.171 The Venetian popolo had essentially no role in
161
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Stanley Chojnacki, Crime, Punishment, and the Trecento Venetian State, in VIOLENCE AND CIVIL DISORDER IN ITALIAN
CITIES, 1200-1500 184, 187 (Lauro Martines ed., 1972); see also Bouwsma, Venice and the Political Education of Europe,
supra note 33, at 448–49 (explaining that Venice was so successful because the constitution “held the potentially antagonistic
forces of the political arena in complementary equilibrium”); see also BOUWSMA, VENICE AND THE DEFENSE OF REPUBLICAN
LIBERTY, supra note 23, at 147–49 (quoting the sixteenth-century patrician Gasparo Contarini: “No greater plague can infect a
republic than when one part prevails over the others . . . if you wish a city or a republic to last, it is above all necessary that no
part should operate more powerfully than the others, but all, as far as possible, should participate in the public authority.”).
See Bouwsma, Venice and the Political Education of Europe, supra note 33, at 455 (“It was usual to attribute the internal
stability of Venice to the excellence of her laws, their strict enforcement and their impartial application to all classes.”); see
also LABALME & WHITE, supra note 51, at 115 (“Law and justice were considered the foundations of the Republic,
guaranteeing its order and longevity, maintaining the unity and structure of its society.”).
LABALME & WHITE, supra note 51, at 115 (explaining that Venetian law applied equally to patricians and citizens).
Bouwsma, Venice and the Political Education of Europe, supra note 33, at 455 (quoting Jean Bodin).
J.R. Hale, Editor’s Preface, in RENAISSANCE VENICE 13, 13–14 (J.R. Hale ed., 1973).
See generally Chojnacki, Crime, Punishment, and the Trecento Venetian State, supra note 161, at 187 (“Among Venetian
public officials . . . there were those who took advantage of their positions to line their pockets.”); Everett & Queller, supra
note 159, at 15–20; 1 HAZLITT, supra note 26, at 593; 2 HAZLITT, supra note 29, at 209, 461-69; BROWN, supra note 27, at
313 (describing “rampant corruption and bribery” within the Great Council); LONGWORTH, supra note 31, at 151, 169, 175
(“[C]orruption was too deeply entrenched in the administration for the system to justify all the plaudits of its admirers.”);
WILLS, supra note 36, at 114 (noting the presence of “electioneering, family pressure, fraud, and bribes in the politics of
Venice”); Gaetano Cozzi, Authority and the Law in Renaissance Venice, in RENAISSANCE VENICE 293, 307 (J.R. Hale ed.,
1973) (finding “no lack” of failures to live up to the Venetian reputation for clean government).
WILLIAM H. MCNEILL, VENICE: THE HINGE OF EUROPE, 1081-1797 225 (1974) (describing the “careful bookkeeping
techniques” that “prevented any widespread peculation”); 2 HAZLITT, supra note 29, at 519–20 (explaining that Venice
enforced rigorous anti-corruption laws).
LONGWORTH, supra note 31, at 151 (noting that many administrators, “especially those overseas,” were corrupt).
LANE, supra note 28, at 259–60 (“Every stage of the election procedure at Venice contained similar evidence that cheating
was expected unless provision was made to prevent it – a sign of the intensity of competition for honors.”).
BOUWSMA, VENICE AND THE DEFENSE OF REPUBLICAN LIBERTY, supra note 23, at 59–60.
Id.
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government.172 Last, a “mixed constitution” might explain why branches of government remained in rough
parity during the course of ordinary politics, but does not explain the absence of rogue actors. Constitutional
rules, by themselves, cannot ensure that no one assembles a small army, disregards the law, and reorganizes
the state.
Equal justice offers an intriguing suggestion, because it plausibly explains the absence of popular
risings. If the masses suffer no outrageous treatment, they should be less inclined to riot. But this is a partial
explanation at best. Many coups—like the Tiepolo Rebellion of 1310—are elite-driven and unconnected to
popular grievances.173 Moreover, benevolent justice may not eradicate revolutionary leanings. Nazis
overthrew the Weimar republic, after all, because they craved domination, not equality. Still, we should
remember that Venetians attributed their own stability to impartial justice.
Recent theorists have credited the nascent Venetian welfare state, and the security it provided the lower
classes.174 This argument overlaps with “equal justice” theory, and suffers the same limitations. Other ideas
include the city’s great wealth,175 the exclusion of priests, bishops, and cardinals from politics,176 the
professional cittadino bureaucracy,177 and even political traditions inherited from Byzantium,178 but it is
unclear why these factors should prove stabilizing.
Some authors argue that personal loyalties—to family, friends, patrons, and clients—decayed in
Venice.179 There is an obvious link to stability: without factions, there can be no “bloody factional strife.”180
But what generated unity? Aside from patriotic virtue, proposals include a sense of shared danger,181 criscrossing blood ties within the small noble class,182 laws and procedures that minimized family clout,183 and
the city’s spatial isolation within the lagoon.184
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See id. (explaining that with the cittadini’s 5% and the nobili’s 5%, only 10% of the population had a role in public life).
E.g., Gerhard Rösch, The Serrata of the Great Council and Venetian Society, 1286-1297, in VENICE RECONSIDERED: THE
HISTORY AND CIVILIZATION OF AN ITALIAN CITY-STATE 1297-1797 67, 81 (John Martin & Dennis Romano eds., 2000)
(explaining that the 1310 Tiepolo Rebellion was not even connected to class-based resentments within the upper echelons,
much less a truly populist rising).
Chojnacki, Crime, Punishment, and the Trecento Venetian State, supra note 161, at 187 (“Scholars in recent times have . . .
pointed to the respect and protection Venetian law extended to the popular classes . . .”); see also BOUWSMA, VENICE AND THE
DEFENSE OF REPUBLICAN LIBERTY, supra note 23, at 150 (describing how the sixteenth-century Venetian scholar and
politician, Gasparo Contarini, praised the government for feeding the people, controlling contagious diseases, and supporting
the sick and elderly); see also LONGWORTH, supra note 31, at 194–95 (“Contarini’s picture of Venice as a welfare state was
exaggeratedly rosy, but though its welfare did not measure up to ideal standards of our own day, compared to other states of
the time it was advanced indeed. Centuries of experience had branded an awareness of the need to forestall social discontent
into the minds of Venice’s rulers, and it was this sensitivity which lay at the root of political stability for which Venice was to
become so justly famed.”).
LONGWORTH, supra note 31, at 261–62 (citing James Howell).
Id.
MCNEILL, supra note 167, at 225 (“What made the regime stable was the activity of professional bureaucrats who staffed the
numerous government offices, boards, councils, and commissions.”).
LANE, supra note 28, at 109 (“Venice could restrain family rivalries more easily because it inherited from the Byzantine
Empire a tradition of unified allegiance to a sovereign state.”).
See, e.g., LANE, supra note 28, at 88–89 (“It was not true that Venice had never known the bloody strife of factions; it was true
that she found means of taming them.”); Everett & Queller, supra note 159, at 20 (“Unable to rely on family, faction, or
patrons for their political future, patricians were obliged to treat all their peers as potential allies, and ingratiate themselves to
everyone.”); LONGWORTH, supra note 31, at 150 (citing “the comparative solidarity of the ruling group”).
LANE, supra note 28, at 89.
WILLS, supra note 36, at 156 (“People cooperate with vigor, follow leaders, [and] coordinate their efforts, when they act from
a sense of shared danger and reciprocal need.”).
See Everett & Queller, supra note 159, at 18 (“The whole patriciate fused together into a dense network of kinship in which
any family would be related to a considerable proportion of all patrician clans.”).
See generally LANE, supra note 28, at 106–17, 271 (describing how factions were kept at bay which enabled the government
to function under the law).
NORWICH, supra note 23, at 155.
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Finally, a few people through the ages have floated a structural idea: no Venetian had the capability to
smash the republic. Early Venice, says a character in a sixteenth-century dialogue, saw frequent bloodshed.
“In later times,” though, “there were Doges and others who aspired to tyranny, but they were soon
suppressed.”185 The political institutions, he concludes, “are well designed to suppress quickly anyone who
begins to rise by taking this road.”186 Some historians sprinkle this notion into their writings, while
remaining equally vague about how it works. We hear that the system “bent patricians toward compromise,
accommodation, and self-effacement,”187 forced them to “treat all their peers as potential allies,”188 and
made it “hard to build a power base.”189 We do not learn exactly how “the system” accomplished these feats.
In Parts IV and V, the Article takes up the last two themes—the absence of factions and a structural
incapacity to topple the regime—to craft a new theory of the coup-free state. For now, we turn to
explanations of British stability.

2. British Stability Examined
Since stable governance became apparent in eighteenth-century Britain, theorists have generated
virtue-based and structural explanations. Some emphasize internalized ideas and values, while others
highlight formal aspects of the British constitutional system. Many weave the two kinds of explanations
together. Charles-Louis de Secondat—the Baron de Montesquieu—inaugurated the systemic study of the
British constitution. In The Spirit of the Laws, published in 1748, Montesquieu heralded England’s unique
system.190 He calls England a republic “disguised under the form of monarchy,”191 and describes it as the
one nation in the world whose constitution aims at “political liberty.”192 For Montesquieu, political liberty is
“a tranquility of mind arising from the opinion each person has of his safety,”193 which occurs when “one
man need not be afraid of another.ǳ194
Famously, Montesquieu attributes British liberty and order to the separation of powers.195 The
executive, legislative, and judicial functions, he argues, operate in largely independent spheres.196 Each
branch checks, moderates, and restrains the others. The balance of forces maintains liberty, and prevents the
rise of tyranny or arbitrary power.197 As a theory of stability, though, separation of powers is weak. It
assumes that the judicial and legislative branches will always be available to check any rogue executive
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DAVID CHAMBERS & BRIAN PULLAN, WITH JENNIFER FLETCHER, VENICE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 1450-1630, at 62 (1992)
(quoting a dialogue by Francesco Guicciardini).
Id.
FINLAY, supra note 28, at 140.
Everett & Queller, supra note 159, at 20.
WILLS, supra note 36, at 111; see also Norwich, supra note 23, at 282 (by 1400, “[a]ny attempt on the part of an individual or
group to gain power or popularity outside the constitutional framework was instantly suppressed,” and political institutions
exhibited “exquisitely calculated systems of checks and balances that made their misuse always difficult and usually
impossible”); see also Chojnacki, Crime, Punishment, and the Trecento Venetian State, supra note 161, at 70 (social
alignments “cut right through the ranks of the great families,” making it “impossible for any one faction . . . to attain
unchallenged supremacy”).
BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Thomas Nugent trans., Hafner Publishing 1949) (1748).
Id. at 68.
Id. at 151.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 151–52.
Id.
Id. at 151–52 (“When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates,
there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to
execute them in a tyrannical manner. Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and
executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the
judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and
oppression.”).
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actors. But what if a junta abolishes those branches and rules by decree? Separation-of-powers principles
cannot explain why no one sends army divisions into the streets, or imprisons the judges and legislators.
Despite his emphasis on constitutional structure, Montesquieu also credits the unusual “spirit” of the
English. Suffering in perpetual rain and gloom, the English are unhappy, suicidal, restless, and constantly
striving for social advancement.198 The public remains vigilant, and prone to mass hysteria over threats to
liberty.199 If any power violated the “fundamental laws,” he notes, “everyone would unite against that
power.”200 While the ordinary people retain their honesty and love of liberty, wrote Montesquieu to an
English friend, “it will be difficult to subvert your constitution.”201
A few decades later, a Swiss-born lawyer named Jean-Louis de Lolme pondered the mysterious calm of
Great Britain.202 De Lolme moved to England as an adult, and published The Constitution of England in 1784.203
De Lolme considers England unique. Unlike all other kingdoms—and the ancient republics—England
does not face a constant threat of men seeking to usurp the “supreme governing authority.”204 For de Lolme,
England’s “remarkable liberty” is due to “the impossibility under which their Leaders, or in general all Men
of power among them, are placed, of invading and transferring to themselves any branch of the Government
Executive authority.”205 The “remarkable solidity of the governing Executive Authority,” he says, “takes
from the great Men in the Nation all serious ambition to invade this authority, thereby preventing those
anarchical and more or less bloody struggles to result from their debates, which have so constantly disturbed
other Countries.”206 In other words, England is distinctive because a coup d’état is impossible.207
But why? What prevents a British coup? Following Montesquieu, de Lolme credits the separation of
powers. Despite spending considerable time on the subject, however, de Lolme seems unsatisfied. He
repeatedly describes English stability as “mysterious” and “astonishing,” and posits “some inward essential
difference” between England and other nations.208 Even amidst political ferment, “insuperable impediments”
block those who might “raise themselves on the wreck of the governing authority.”209 A “secret force” goes
to work, which “gradually brings things back to a state of moderation and calm.”210 Those who “seem to
have it in their power” to seize executive authority, he remarks, “are, somehow, prevented from entertaining
thoughts of doing so.”211 But what prevents politicians from imagining themselves as Caesar or Cromwell?
And what explains the “astonishing subordination” of military leaders to civilian rule? De Lolme cannot
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Id. at 231–32, 307–15.
Id. at 231–32, 308–09.
Id. at 309.
C.P. Courtney, Montesquieu and English Liberty, in MONTESQUIEU’S SCIENCE OF POLITICS: ESSAYS ON THE SPIRIT OF LAWS
273, 286 (David W. Carrithers et al. eds., 2001).
JEAN-LOUIS DE LOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND (1793) (1784).
Id. at ii.
See id. at 436–37 (“In other Monarchies, those Men who, during the continuation of the public disturbances . . . finding it in
their power . . . to parcel out . . . the supreme governing authority . . . and to transfer the same to themselves . . . constantly did
so, in the same manner, and from the very same reasons, as it constantly happened in the ancient Commonwealths . . . . But in
England, the great Men in the Nation finding themselves in a situation essentially different, lost no time in pursuits like those
in which the great Men of other countries used to indulge themselves on the occasion we mention.”).
Id. at 387.
Id. at 433.
See id. at 79–80 (“For though, by wise distribution of the powers of Government, great usurpations are become in a manner
impracticable . . . .”).
Id. at 390, 419, 442 (invoking the “mysterious solidity” and “stability” of the English crown and citing “the astonishing
subordination in which the military is kept to the civil power”).
Id. at 440.
Id. (noting also that “mighty struggles” are moderated “by some means or other”; and that an occasionally stormy political sea,
“to appearance so deeply agitated, constantly stops at certain limits which it seems as if it wanted the power to pass”).
Id. at 408; see also id. at 438 (stating that English elites “somehow” judge it “impracticable” to transfer executive authority “to
themselves or their party”).
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identify the pressure keeping every Englishman within constitutionally-ordained boundaries. He never gets
beyond “somehow.”212
Renowned Victorian scholar Albert Venn Dicey acknowledged the mystery of British stability, but
determined that it was unsolvable. Dicey crafted a meticulous theory to explain how the unwritten, implicit
conventions of the British Constitution were enforced.213 No one would be able to subvert those
conventions, he argued, without violating other laws, which are enforceable in court.214 For example, if
Parliament did not assemble for two years, tax revenues would cease to be legally due, and anyone who
collected taxes would face criminal charges.215 The “boldest political adventurer” must “obey the
fundamental principles of the constitution,” Dicey concludes, because breaching them “will almost
immediately bring the offender into conflict with the courts and the law of the land.”216 But what if the
“adventurer” rules by force? What if he kills the judges or intimidates them into submission? Facing this
question, Dicey threw up his hands. “No constitution can be absolutely safe from revolution or from a coup
d’état,” he writes. “No one is concerned to show, what indeed can never be shown, that the law can never be
defied, or the constitution never be overthrown.”217
Today, the mystery remains palpable. “Call it socialization or tradition,” says Peter Karsten, “something has
been at work in certain competitive democracies to preclude military coups—something other than economic
prosperity, constitutional formulas, or careful stroking of military elites.” Karsten falls back on virtue: coups are
absent when the military believes “that it should remain subject to civilian control.”218
Like their counterparts in Venetian studies, the historians of England postulate a structural immunity to
revolution, but fail to craft a convincing theory.219 We hear that Crown, Parliament, and judiciary balance
each other, ensuring that no one, “not even the monarch,” exceeds their boundaries.220 Radical groups have
been too weak to challenge the British state,221 but that does not explain why military commanders or
politicians have failed to seize power. After 1688, one author suggests, few Britons advocated revolution,
and none “had the means of achieving it.”222
B. MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM: THE PREVAILING THEORY OF STABILITY
Almost every scholar who addresses the question of why coups don’t happen in what are called the
“mature democracies” invokes professional military norms.223 I call this the “virtue theory” because it
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Id. at 438.
DICEY, supra note 4, at 420-52.
Id. at 441.
Id. at 441–51.
Id. at 445–46.
Id. at 451.
Peter Karsten, The Coup d’État and Civilian Control of the Military in Competitive Democracies, in TO SHEATHE THE SWORD:
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE QUEST FOR DEMOCRACY 149, 155 (John P. Lovell & David E. Albright eds., 1977).
See DE LOLME, supra note 202, at 408 (“English elites somehow judge it impracticable to transfer executive authority to
themselves or their party.”); MONTESQUIEU, supra note 190, at 151–52, 231–32, 307–15 (attributing stability to the balance of
powers and unique “spirit” of the English); DICEY, supra note 4, at 420–52 (finding the mystery of British stability
unsolvable).
CORNISH & CLARK, supra note 102, at 10.
See generally THOMIS & HOLT, supra note 24, at 100–33 (providing a detailed history of groups that attempted to revolt
against the British state).
GILMOUR, supra note 24, at 7–8.
To my knowledge, the only exception is Bruce Farcau, who identifies the scale and complexity of modern states as factors that
make coups difficult or impossible. In the United States, for example, “even a modicum of control over the country could not
be established without seizing dozens of locations in half a dozen massive cities, to say nothing of hundreds of transportation
chokepoints, airports, television and radio stations, microwave transmission centers, and many major military bases scattered
over tens of thousands of square miles of territory.” Ultimately, Farcau concludes, coups depend on “the number, diversity,
and dispersion of targets.” BRUCE W. FARCAU, THE COUP: TACTICS IN THE SEIZURE OF POWER 88-89 (1994). Farcau’s
analysis, however, does not mesh very well with the historical record. Venice, for example, was a highly centralized imperial
state, with just a few critical targets inside the city. Yet it seems to have gone for centuries without any coups or coup
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depends on inner attitudes, education, and training. Ultimately, it suggests that officers could coup, but that
they won’t for ethical reasons.
Louis Smith, an American military historian, explained the U.S. military’s failure to mount any coup
attempts through inner restraints.224
The major factor in civil control lies in the fact that the military have never manifested any
ambition to usurp first power in America and to overwhelm for all our citizens the great values of
freedom under the law. In entering the armed forces, the American does not put off the citizen in
becoming the soldier. The habits of obedience to authority and respect for law persist.225
Samuel Huntington’s 1957 work, The Soldier and the State, helped define the field of “civilmilitary relations.”226 Huntington argues that Western states since the nineteenth century have
developed what he calls “objective civilian control.”227 The essence of objective control is “the
recognition of autonomous military professionalism.”228 This produces “professional attitudes and
behavior among the members of the officer corps,” rendering them “politically sterile and neutral.”229
Civilian control is assured, writes Huntington, only when the armed forces are motivated by purely
“military ideals.”230
Samuel Finer’s The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, published in 1962,
presents another classic “internalization” account.231 Finer explains that “military professionalism”232
inhibits the desire to mount a coup within “mature political cultures.” He includes Britain, the United States,
Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, and the Netherlands
among the list of these cultures.233 When commanders grow immersed in complex technical tasks, Finer
argues, they lose interest in politics.234 The “truly effective check” against a military coup, according to
Finer, is a “firm acceptance of civilian supremacy.”235
Eric Nordlinger wrote that “subordination to civilian authority” must be thoroughly internalized.
“Soldiers who are imbued with these beliefs and values—what might be referred to as the civilian ethic—are
attitudinally disposed to accept civilian authority and to retain a neutral, depoliticized stance even when in
sharp disagreement with the government.”236
We might suspect that military leaders are predisposed to embrace “virtue theory” because it bolsters
their own patriotic aura, and burnishes the reputation of the armed forces. Why not take credit for an
extraordinary record of restraint? In fact, to avoid suspicion, military leaders must say they believe in
constitutional succession, and would never consider mounting a coup d’état. During the Watergate crisis, for
example, one senior commander repudiated rumors of a military intervention by assuring a reporter that he
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attempts. See supra notes 13-54 and accompanying text. Tiny states like Luxembourg and Iceland are similarly coup-free, but
historical giants including Rome, Byzantium, and the Ottoman Empire, and modern states such as Russia, have lurched from
coup d’état to coup d’état.
LOUIS SMITH, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND MILITARY POWER: A STUDY OF CIVIL CONTROL OF THE MILITARY POWER IN THE
UNITED STATES (1951).
Id. at 263.
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND POLITICS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 74-84
(1957).
Id. at 83.
Id.
Id. at 83–84.
Id. at 74.
S.E. FINER, THE MAN ON HORSEBACK: THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN POLITICS (1988).
Id. at 20–26.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 26.
ERIC A. NORDLINGER, SOLDIERS IN POLITICS: MILITARY COUPS AND GOVERNMENTS 13 (1977).
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and his colleagues recognized their Constitutional duties.237 But this does not mean that the virtue-based
story that military leaders tell—to the general public, to scholars, to cadets at the academies, and to
themselves—identifies the true causal mechanism behind centuries of constitutional leadership succession.
There are two main problems with virtue theory as an explanation for long-term stability. First, it
simply displaces the causal explanation back one level. Why do some military organizations internalize
professional norms, while others retain “unprofessional” attitudes? Presumably, all political leaders—from
hereditary monarchs to elected presidents—have sought to instill obedience and loyalty within their security
forces.238 None of the “virtue theorists” explain in detail why or how professional values took root within
certain states, but not others.239
Second, virtue theory is inordinately complex. It requires a precise mode of education or socialization,
throughout the entire political-military establishment, so as to nullify basic self-interest, over very long
periods of time. Socialization must be precise, in that it must instill the wrongness of extra-constitutional
action, against the potent human tendency to rationalize what one desires. In times of crisis, for example,
when people may legitimately sense that a leadership change is vital for everyone’s safety or well being,
constitutional values must continue to trump all other considerations.
The socialization must take effect throughout the entire political and military class. This may seem
relatively straightforward in a city equipped with a state-run system of education, training, and
indoctrination, such as ancient Sparta or modern Singapore, but what about a sprawling, diverse nation like
the United States of America? How exactly are all Americans entering the political-military establishment
inculcated with constitutional values? Is it at home, by parents and teachers? Is it when a person joins the
military or enters politics?
Obviously, the anti-coup training must directly counteract what most people consider basic selfinterest. Men must willingly forgo the chance for great power, everlasting fame, and all the riches they could
possibly desire, all because they are committed to an ethical standard. Virtue theory violates an ancient
perception: that people will frequently do whatever they can get away with.240 Glaucon makes this point at
the beginning of Plato’s Republic, when he tells the story of the Ring of Gyges.241 The ancestor of Gyges
was a shepherd who discovered a ring that, when turned the right way, rendered its wearer invisible. The
shepherd immediately set out to make use of his new power. He got a job as the king’s messenger,
committed adultery with the king’s wife, murdered the king, and ruled as tyrant.242 Of course, the rest of the
Republic presents Socrates’ elaborate response, in which he insists that people can learn to love justice for
its own sake. This requires, however, a strenuous ethical education and communal lifestyle for the ruling
philosopher-kings.243 In essence, virtue theory claims that today’s mature democracies have achieved this
Platonic ideal, with military guardians so well trained they can easily ignore the temptations of injustice.
Such an explanation would surprise many of our constitutional Framers, who thought that men were
“ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious,”244 that “if men were angels, no government would be necessary,”245
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Karsten, supra note 218, at 155.
See, e.g., FINER, supra note 231, at 25 (discussing President Kennedy’s assertion that the military must be subject to civilian
control); NORDLINGER, supra note 236, at 12-13 (referencing the statement by President Nkrumah of Ghana that “[i]t is not the
duty of a soldier to criticize or endeavor to interfere in any way with political affairs of the country . . . .”).
See, e.g., Finer, supra note 231, at 20-22 (citing professionalism as a deterrent to military intervention but not discussing how
a State imbues the military with professionalism).
See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 45 (Neill H. Alford, Jr. et al. eds, Francis MacDonald Cornford trans., 1991) (“No one, it is
commonly believed, would have such iron strength of mind as to stand fast in doing right or keep his hands off other men’s
goods, when he could go to the market-place and fearlessly help himself to anything he wanted, enter houses and sleep with
any woman he chose, set prisoners free, and kill men at his pleasure, and in a word go about among men with the powers of a
god.”).
Id. at 44–45.
Id.
Id. at 47–53.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 6, at 35 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Gaylord Bourne ed., 1901).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 354 (James Madison) (Edward Gaylord Bourne ed., 1901).
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and that the structure of government must remedy “the defect of better motives” through “opposite and rival
interests.”246
Finally, the whole edifice of rigorous and universal ethical training must last for centuries. This is quite
a feat, especially because values and cultural attitudes can change rapidly. Even as new ideas and behavioral
norms pass through the population, constitutionalism must remain a bedrock principle.
By themselves, each of these four requirements is quite a stretch. In combination, they seem to demand
a total suspension of common sense. To put it more formally, the theory requires a long series of tenuous
assumptions and inferences. None of this is to deny the existence of genuine idealism, patriotism, or selfsacrifice—it is simply that virtue theory as an explanation for long-term stability places too much weight on
these fleeting capacities. Virtue theory requires an inspired idealism among too many people, for far too
long, in the face of staggering incentives pressing in the other direction.
Still, the question remains: why are coups absent in certain states? Is there a structural explanation for
the long-term absence of revolutions and coups d’état in states like Venice, Great Britain, the United States,
and 20 other states around the world? If so, it might account for the intuitions of theorists from de Lolme to
Karsten, who imagine a “secret force” or “something” ensuring stability.247
Following A.V. Dicey, we might reasonably assume that the courts produce lawful government.248 Can
the “rule of law,” enforced by independent and impartial courts, explain stability, nonviolent politics, and the
absence of coups d’état?

IV.

THE RULE OF LAW IN VENICE AND BRITAIN

Renaissance Venice was renowned for its uniquely fair, impartial, and dependable legal system.249
Eighteenth-century Britain established a similar reputation.250 The two states were hardly identical, of
course. They progressed along different timelines, developed unique constitutions, and promulgated separate
bodies of law. But at a broad level of comparison, Venice and Britain exhibited parallel legal orders. Each
state created a judicial system with equality under the law,251 rational inquiry,252 public adversarial
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Id. at 355.
See DE LOLME, supra note 202 at 79–80 (“For though, by wise distribution of the powers of Government, great usurpations
are become in a manner impracticable . . .”); see also Karsten, supra note 218, at 155 (“[S]omething has been at work in
certain competitive democracies to preclude military coups—something other than economic prosperity, constitutional
formulas, or careful stroking of military elites.”).
See DICEY, supra note 4, at 131 (“Authority, again, may be given to some person of body of persons, and preferably to the
courts, to adjudicate upon the constitutionality of legislative acts, and treat them as void if they are inconsistent with the letter
or the spirit of the constitution.”).
Bouwsma, Venice and the Political Education of Europe, supra note 33, at 455 (citing the general appreciation for the
“excellence of [Venetian] laws, their strict enforcement and their impartial application to all classes”); LABALME & WHITE,
supra note 51, at 115; Hale, supra note 165, at 13–14 (quoting Sir John Smythe regarding the “justice dulie and equallie
ministred” in Venice).
ANTHONY BABINGTON, THE RULE OF LAW IN BRITAIN FROM THE ROMAN OCCUPATION TO THE PRESENT DAY: THE ONLY
LIBERTY 179, 201 (3rd ed. 1995) (explaining how courts had become the “guardians of law”); see generally David Lemmings,
Introduction, in THE ENGLISH AND THEIR LAWS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 1 (David Lemmings ed., 2005); ESMÉ
WINGFIELD-STRATFORD, THE SQUIRE AND HIS RELATIONS 92 (1956); GILMOUR, supra note 24, at 21, 434 (explaining the
British legal system).
NORWICH, supra note 23, at 275; Chojnacki, Crime, Punishment, and the Trecento Venetian State, supra note 161, at 227;
LANE, supra note 28, at 271–73 (explaining equality under the law in Venice); see 1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 407–08 (1898) (noting that all free men in Britain are equal under the law).
See THAYER, supra note 30, at 219–22; Cozzi, supra note 166, at 307–09 (extensively describing the legal system in Venice);
see also Edward Powell, Jury Trial at Gaol Delivery in the Late Middle Ages: The Midland Circuit, 1400-1429, in TWELVE
GOOD MEN AND TRUE: THE CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND, 1200-1800, at 106–16 (J. S. Cockburn & Thomas Green eds.,
1988); TREVELYAN, supra note 77, at 138 (detailing the legal history of Britain).
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debates,253procedural protections for criminal defendants,254 a legal profession closely intertwined with
political elites,255 and an independent judiciary.256 In Venice and in Britain, all state actions were subject to
legal scrutiny,257 and this “rule of law” brought low governmental corruption258 and economic prosperity.259
From its rudimentary origins at the Doge’s court, the machinery of Venetian justice evolved gradually.
By the fifteenth century, grand committees of forty presided in Venetian tribunals, and cases could move
through a series of appellate hearings.260 The Doge’s Council was generally supposed to hear complaints of
injustice, and the Great Council occasionally settled matters when political-legal controversies grew
volatile.261 “On the whole,” concluded a British lawyer who published an immense two-volume history of
Venice, “there was probably no early European State, where property and life were equally secure from
violence, and where nocturnal repose might be enjoyed almost as confidently as in a modern home.”262
England developed a centralized, national system of laws and courts during an age generally known for
feudal anarchy. When William the Conqueror arrived in 1066, he acquired a kingdom with a particularly
strong central government; he and his Norman descendants strengthened it further.263 Royal courts
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See THAYER, supra note 30, at 219; Cozzi, supra note 166, at 307–09 (describing the judicial system and jurisdictional
restraints that allowed for the adversarial process in Venice); see also Powell, supra note 252, at 106–16; Thomas A. Green, A
Retrospective on the Criminal Trial Jury, 1200-1800, in TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE: THE CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY IN
ENGLAND, 1200-1800, at 374 (J. S. Cockburn & Thomas Green eds., 1988) (noting the evolution of the trial process and
adversarial proceedings in Britain).
Chojnacki, Crime, Punishment, and the Trecento Venetian State, supra note 161, at 221–23; THAYER, supra note 30, at 219–
21; Cozzi, supra note 166, at 308–09 (detailing the rights of the defendant during interrogation and the accused’s right to
counsel in Venice); see generally J.S. COCKBURN & THOMAS GREEN, TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE: THE CRIMINAL TRIAL
JURY IN ENGLAND, 1200-1800 (1988); F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 221 (Cambridge
University Press, 1963); JAMES HEATH, TORTURE AND ENGLISH LAW 46–48 (1982) (explaining the trial process and the rights
of the accused in Britain).
LONGWORTH, supra note 31, at 126; MCNEILL, supra note 167, at 225; 2 HAZLITT, supra note 29, at 821–22; LABALME &
WHITE, supra note 51, at 115 (describing how noblemen consistently controlled the political, economic, and legal world in
Venice); see generally BABINGTON, supra note 250, at 123; J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 133–
216 (2nd ed. 1979); BOWEN, supra note 76, at 58–68, 278–80 (illustrating broadly how the legal arena was controlled mainly
by British aristocracy).
See 2 HAZLITT, supra note 29, at 455–57; Labalme & White, supra note 51, at 148–51; HAITSMA MULIER, supra note 34, at
152–56; Gilbert, supra note 49, at 494 (explaining the judicial branch of the Venetian government); see generally BABINGTON,
supra note 250, at 201; BAKER, supra note 255, at 145, n.20; LYON, supra note 98, at 263; FREDERICK GEORGE MARCHAM, A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN ENGLAND, 1485 TO THE PRESENT 238–39 (1960); KEIR, supra note 24, at 294
(describing the British judicial system).
See LANE, supra note 28, at 95–100, 256; Cozzi, supra note 166, at 307; WIEL, supra note 71, at 191–92; NORWICH, supra
note 23, at 499; 2 HAZLITT, supra note 29, at 457–59. (describing that government questions of “importance” and “gravity”
such as foreign policy decisions and granting pardons were subject to Venetian legal review or “built in checks and balances”);
see also DICEY, supra note 4, at 222; KEIR, supra note 24, at 29, 294 (explaining that British judges often provided a necessary
check and on “local authorities” and “governmental authority” through close supervision).
See MCNEILL, supra note 167, at 225; WILLS, supra note 36, at 124; 2 HAZLITT, supra note 29, at 480–81, 519–20; NORWICH,
supra note 23, at 499; BOWEN, supra note 75, at 428 (detailing how the Venetian legal system, specifically, the accurate
bookkeeping, the distribution of bureaucratic functions, the avoidance of bribery, and harsh punishment for corruption fostered
stability); see also HOLMES & SZECHI, supra note 79, at 326; KEIR, supra note 24, at 373.
See NORWICH, supra note 23, at 155, 277–82; LONGWORTH, supra note 31, at 172–73 (describing the luxuries and wealth of
Venice); see also GEOFFREY HOLMES, THE MAKING OF A GREAT POWER: PRE-INDUSTRIAL BRITAIN, 1660-1722 36, 52, 257–
61, 356 (1993); HOLMES & SZECHI, supra note 79, at 133–43; EVANS, supra note 100, at 107–09 (describing rising British
wealth in the eighteenth century).
2 HAZLITT, supra note 29, at 491; 1 BROWN, supra note 75, at 309–12.
See generally LANE, supra note 28, at 96–97; 2 HAZLITT, supra note 29, at 461–71 (detailing the functions of the different
councils).
2 HAZLITT, supra note 29, at 577.
See generally R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, THE BIRTH OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW 10, 90–92 (1973) (noting how the
organization of a central state occurred early in England); D.J.A. MATTHEW, THE NORMAN CONQUEST 10, 149–64, 268–72
(1966); MICHAEL POWICKE, MILITARY OBLIGATION IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 25 (1962); R.H.C. Davis, The Norman Conquest,
in THE IMPACT OF THE NORMAN CONQUEST 123, 125–27 (C. Warren Hollister ed., 1969) (describing relatively efficient
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dispensing “Common Law” became popular venues, as litigants sought to harness their power.264 Over the
centuries, royal justice developed an increasingly firm and impartial presence across the country.265
Each state dispensed justice in a roughly egalitarian manner, without regard to social rank.266 In
Venice, nobiles and cittadini did enjoy specific political privileges,267 but in theory, could expect no
advantage in court. Promissioni—contracts drawn up at the beginning of each doge’s reign—provided that
Venice had only one law, for the doge and the poorest fisherman.268 In England, the Common Law paid little
attention to social estates and ranks.269 As serfdom grew obsolete in the later middle ages, all Englishmen
were “free.” England exhibited a social hierarchy of minute gradations, with no chasms between legally
distinct castes.270
Each state developed rational systems of fact-finding, including adversarial courtroom contests.
Regular Venetian courts (i.e., not the Council of Ten) featured lively public debates, in which defense
counsel sparred with prosecutors.271 English juries determined questions of fact, and by the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries, jurors largely relied upon evidence presented in court.272
Venice and England each pioneered certain protections for criminal defendants. These should not be
overstated: Miranda rights did not apply, but compared to their neighbors, these states provided humane
sanctuaries for the accused.273
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taxation and administration in the Anglo-Saxon kingdom); JOHN P. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES 116-17, 180-88
(1960) (describing how the survival of the system can largely be accredited to the English central government in 1066 and
after); 1 MARC BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY 270–71 (1961) (detailing the centralization of the country); T.A. CRITCHLEY, A
HISTORY OF POLICE IN ENGLAND AND WALES 2–3 (1967) (explaining that following the conquest, the Normans further
“tightened” the system); BAKER, supra note 255, at 13 (illustrating that the Normans strengthened the system by instituting
“safeguards”).
VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 263, at 17–18, 88–89; see also RENÉ DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN
THE WORLD TODAY 287–91 (1968); 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 251, at 108 (illustrating the differences between
equity and common law).
See MICHAEL HICKS, BASTARD FEUDALISM 123–24 (1995) (suggesting that the eleventh through seventeenth centuries
probably witnessed a “gradual progression towards less partial administration of justice”); see also Ted Gurr, Historical
Trends in Violent Crime: A Critical Review of the Evidence, 3 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 295,
313 (1981) (combining data from numerous sources and finding that homicide rates in England dropped dramatically from
1200 to 1950, before rising relatively slightly in the late twentieth century).
See NORWICH, supra note 23, at 275 (commenting that in theory and mostly in practice, every man in Venice was equal in the
sight of the law); LANE, supra note 28, at 271 (“Venice maintained also the high reputation it had gained in earlier centuries
for equitable administration of justice. Nobles and commoners had equal standing in court.”); Chojnacki, Crime, Punishment,
and the Trecento Venetian State, supra note 161, at 223–27 (showing that patricians and commoners in the thirteenth century
received equal sentences for equal crimes); THAYER, supra note 30, at 221–22 (noting that foreigners came to Venice seeking
a fair tribunal); see generally LYON, supra note 98, at 263 (“From the early eighteenth century, the judiciary increasingly
applied and developed the law without fear or favour.”); Lemmings, supra note 250, at 1–26; DICEY, supra note 4, passim.
BOUWSMA, VENICE AND THE DEFENSE OF REPUBLICAN LIBERTY, supra note 23, at 59–60 (describing the privileges of the
nobili and cittadini in public life).
1 HAZLITT, supra note 26, at 629.
1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 251, at 407–08.
E.g., RICHARD W. KAEUPER, WAR, JUSTICE, AND PUBLIC ORDER: ENGLAND AND FRANCE IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES 364
(1988) (“English society showed a series of gradiations merging one into another, an unbroken spectrum rather than a ladder
of clearly stratified social ranks.”).
Cozzi, supra note 166, at 307–09 (explaining the difference between the Council of Ten and adversarial Venetian courts,
where there were public trials and debate between lawyers); see also THAYER, supra note 30, at 219 (“Prosecutors were
warned not to cross-question in a vexatious spirit.”).
See generally Green, supra note 253, at 374 (describing the change in the jury role from medieval times); Dawson, supra note
260, at 124–29; Powell, supra note 252, at 115–16; BAKER, supra note 255, at 65–66 (illustrating the history of how jurors
became triers of fact in Britain).
See Chojnacki, Crime, Punishment, and the Trecento Venetian State, supra note 161, at 221–23 (describing the “scrupulous”
defendant-friendly aspects of Venetian criminal procedures); see also SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIE
(S.B. Chrimes trans. and ed., 1942) (describing the superiority of English procedures compared to the cruel and arbitrary
treatment prevailing throughout much of the Continent).
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In Venice, defendants had the right to choose their own counsel, which would otherwise be appointed by
the court.274 The exception to this right was the Council of Ten, where defendants appeared alone.275 Torture
was occasionally employed, particularly in treason cases, but with some safeguards. A certain number of the
Signoria and Forty were supposed to be present, and prisoners could not be pushed “beyond the normal limit,”
whatever that meant.276 Unless the situation was urgent, the State Attorney needed a warrant from the Forty to
make an arrest.277 If a police officer made an arrest, he had to secure the approval of his colleagues within the
week, or the prisoner was released.278 Venetian prisons were relatively clean and hygienic,279 although that
probably isn’t saying much, considering the rat-infested, turd-littered dungeons of Renaissance Europe.280
In England, the jury system was long regarded as a defendant’s primary shield against arbitrary or
unfair treatment.281 This is not to say that juries were incorruptible: bribery and selective empanelling of
jurors sometimes affected the outcome of cases.282 Torture clearly occurred, especially under the Tudors, but
it was applied by royal tribunals like the Privy Council and Court of Star Chamber (not the ordinary law
courts), required a royal warrant, and usually involved matters of state security.283 Like the Star Chamber,
torture was abolished after 1642.284 “Due process of law” first appeared in a fourteenth-century statute.285
Over time, it came to mean that any judicial process had to include a fair hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.286 Defendants imprisoned in violation of the law could use the writ of Habeas corpus to gain their
freedom, especially after the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.287
In Venice and in England, legal expertise and skilled analysis became prized assets, which enabled
aspirants to rise in government and politics. Law framed political debates among Venetian patricians.288
Cittadini constituted a second stratum of legal professionals; many studied law and public administration at
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LANE, supra note 28, at 271–73.
Cozzi, supra note 166, at 309.
THAYER, supra note 30, at 219 (noting that in cases of torture, “the law grimly insisted that this must not be pushed ‘beyond
the normal limit’”); see also 2 HAZLITT, supra note 29, at 614 (“At Venice, torture was seldom applied, except in cases of
treason in which it was found impracticable to elicit the truth by gentler means, and the law directed that in no circumstances
should any person be subjected to the process, unless a certain number of the Privy Council and the Forty were present to take
depositions and to observe that no undue cruelty was exercised.”); see also Chojnacki, Crime, Punishment, and the Trecento
Venetian State, supra note 161, at 223 (noting that suspected thieves were tortured to recover stolen goods, but the torture was
governed by “careful procedures”).
Cozzi, supra note 166, at 309.
Chojnacki, Crime, Punishment, and the Trecento Venetian State, supra note 161, at 222–23.
2 HAZLITT, supra note 29, at 611.
See, e.g., id. (contrasting the Venetian prisons to those in Germany where the conditions were dark, cold, isolated, and
“swarming with vermin”).
SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIE (S. B. Chrimes ed. trans., Cambridge University Press 1942) (1546).
J.B. Post, Jury Lists and Juries in the Late Fourteenth Century, in TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE: THE CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY
IN ENGLAND, 1200-1800 65, 72 (J.S. Cockburn & Thomas Green eds., 1988).
MAITLAND, supra note 254, at 221 (noting that the Court of Star Chamber developed unique procedures, including torture, but
torture never became part of ordinary court procedures, and remained strictly a practice of the royal council); FORTESCUE,
supra note 273, at 47 (explaining that torture was used for “guarding security”); MARCHAM, supra note 256, at 32–33
(describing the Tudor Privy Council’s use of torture); KEIR, supra note 24, at 99 (describing the Tudor Privy Council’s use of
arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, and spies); BOWEN, supra note 75, at 92–93 (noting that torture was only performed by the
privy council); HEATH, supra note 254, at 105 (describing how “specific instructions” were necessary if torture was going to
be used).
HEATH, supra note 254, at xvii (noting torture occurred as late as 1640); BOWEN, supra note 75, at n. 92 (“After the
Commonwealth [1649] there is no instance of torture in England.”).
BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 26 (2004).
Id.
BAKER, supra note 255, at 126–28.
LABALME & WHITE, supra note 51, at 115 (explaining that debates about the law form an important part of the Venetian
record); see also, e.g., 2 HAZLITT, supra note 29, at 821–22 (describing a Great Council meeting in 1410 where the Doge
declared the Avogadori had no jurisdiction in a matter, the Avogadori responded that the Doge had no right under the
Promissione to interfere, and fined him for committing a misdemeanor).
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the University of Padua and qualified for office by passing examinations.289 By the sixteenth century,
Englishmen trained for legal careers in London, at the Inns of Court.290 Young gentlemen preparing to
manage their estates, and to serve as Justices of the Peace and Members of Parliament, also attended.291
Aside from dispersing knowledge of law across the top social strata, this premium on expertise
contributed to impartiality because lawyers and judges proved their abilities by applying legal doctrines
correctly.292 The young Edward Coke, for example, first gained notoriety by arguing a complaint about the
food served in the Inner Temple. Coke stated his case “so exactly,” says a chronicler, that “all the House
admired him and his pleading it, so that the whole Bench took notice of him.”293
In Venice, judges were independent because they were elected by a large council,294 their terms were
always short,295 and they voted by ballot in committees (which provided numerical cover).296 While other
Italian cities routinely hired foreign jurists, who might stand above local factions, Venice trusted its own
patricians.297 According to a Florentine, Venetian judges rendered fair verdicts because they suffered no
political interference.298
English judges of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries sometimes ruled against the Crown,299 but
doing so was problematic because they served at the monarch’s pleasure,300 and kings often expected
cooperation on matters touching their own interests.301 But after 1688, judges were commissioned during
“good behavior”—meaning they could only be removed for cause—and the 1701 Act of Settlement
guaranteed this form of judicial tenure.302 After 1701, Parliament could not pressure judges by withholding
salaries or by tempting them with raises,303and judges retained office unless majorities in both Houses of
Parliament found them guilty of misconduct.304 Since then, British judges have served as independent
bastions of state power.305
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LONGWORTH, supra note 31, at 126; THAYER, supra note 30, at 221–22; see also MCNEILL, supra note 167, at 225 (noting that
cittadini civil servants were regularly the real decision-makers).
RICHARD H. BRITNELL, THE COMMERCIALISATION OF ENGLISH SOCIETY 1000-1500, at 216 (1996).
Id. at 215–16 (1996); see generally Baker, supra note 255, at 133–49 (explaining the British legal profession).
See LABALME & WHITE, supra note 51, at 115 (“The legal activity of so many of the political committees and councils ensured
patricians a broad exposure to the legal system . . . .”).
BOWEN, supra note 75, at 68.
LANE, supra note 28, at 96.
Id. at 96–97; 2 HAZLITT, supra note 29, at 455–57; BROWN, supra note 27, at 309–10.
LANE, supra note 28, at 405 (noting the prominence of balloting throughout the Venetian constitution); 2 HAZLITT, supra note
29, at 456 (describing balloting procedures within the Council of Ten); LABALME & WHITE, supra note 51, at 148–51 (noting
cases where persons were pardoned by balloting procedures); HAITSMA MULIER, supra note 34, at 152–53 (referring to secret
balloting in Venetian courts).
LANE, supra note 28, at 98 (“The other Italian communes felt it necessary to employ a foreigner in order to have a supreme
judge and an executive in whom impartiality could at least be hoped for. The Venetians had more confidence in themselves
and in each other.”); see also HAITSMA MULIER, supra note 34, at 156 (contrasting Genoa with Venice, and noting that in
Genoa, “[a]ll the judges were foreigners which was not unusual for Italy where family feuds could make an undisturbed
dispensation of justice impossible”).
Gilbert, supra note 49, at 494 (citing Florentine observer Donato Giannotti).
BABINGTON, supra note 250, at 123; see also CORNISH & CLARK, supra note 102, at 8 (citing a “much longer tradition of
judicial independence” before 1701).
Daniel M. Klerman & Paul G. Mahoney, The Value of Judicial Independence: Evidence from Eighteenth Century England, 7
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 8 (2005); BAKER, supra note 255, at 143–46.
BAKER, supra note 255, at 144 (“[K]ings often expected subservience from their judges in matters affecting the Crown.”).
Id. at 145–46 & n.20; MAITLAND, supra note 254, at 312–13; MARCHAM, supra note 256, at 123, 238–39; LYON, supra note 98,
at 263; see also BABINGTON, supra note 250, at 201 (“Following the revolution of 1688 the courts had come to be regarded as the
guardians of the rule of law, the independent arbiters between the executive and the subject, and the protectors of civil liberties.”).
See Lemmings, supra note 250, at 1–26 (explaining that judicial appointments ended upon the monarch’s death, and a few
judges were removed by new monarchs in 1702, 1714, and 1727); see also BAKER, supra note 255, at 145–46 (explaining that
the official traditions now restrict judicial interference); LYON, supra note 98, at 263 (noting that after 1760, judicial tenure
extended beyond the life of the monarch).
LYON, supra note 98, at 263; MARCHAM, supra note 256, at 123.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 268 (15th ed., 1809) (calling the “distinct and separate
existence of the judicial power” a “main preservative of the public liberty”); JOHN PHILLIP REID, RULE OF LAW: THE
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At its core, the “rule of law” means that legal rules control the exercise of state power.306 The rule of
law requires, and builds upon, the facets of a legal system identified above.
“The affairs of Venice are governed with laws,” proclaimed the Republic.307 No magistrate or
committee could exceed legal boundaries with impunity, because other dignitaries—notably the Avogadori
or State Attorneys—served as watchdogs.308 State Attorneys themselves could be sued for dereliction of
duty,309 and everyone in Venice might find themselves under scrutiny by the Council of Ten.310 Despite their
secrecy, forbidding reputation, streamlined procedures, and broad powers, even the Council of Ten observed
strict rules.311 State Attorneys attended their meetings,312 and no member of the Ten could sit in judgment
upon a relative, or accept any gifts or presents.313 From time to time, the Ten expelled one of their own, with
no reason recorded.314
Before 1600, the English crown essentially policed itself.315 In the early seventeenth century, Chief Justice
Edward Coke, of the Court of King’s Bench, began appropriating this function. Under the Common Law, Coke
claimed jurisdiction to correct “errors and misdemeanors extrajudicial, tending to the breach of the peace, or
oppression of the subjects . . . or any other manner of misgovernment.”316 Distinctive principles of English law
had formed; all governmental powers were subject to the regular law courts, and ordinary subjects could sue for a
remedy if any official exceeded his authority.317 By the eighteenth century, the rule-of-law principle was firmly
established in Britain.318 “Individuals of the most exalted rank, wrote Jean-Louis de Lolme in the 1770s, “do not
entertain so much as the thought to raise the smallest direct opposition to the operation of the law.”319
Low corruption is a close corollary of the rule of law.320 On the whole, the Venetian Republic earned
a reputation for rigor, scruples, and good government.321 By and large, cittadini bureaucrats minimized
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JURISPRUDENCE OF LIBERTY IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 6 (2004) (citing Blackstone); MAITLAND, supra
note 254, at 312–13 (noting that judicial independence was “secured” by the early eighteenth century); KEIR, supra note 24, at
294 (“Made independent of the executive by the Act of Settlement, the judges were almost equally so of the legislature, which
could obtain their dismissal only by a joint address from both Houses to the Crown.”); MARCHAM, supra note 256, at 238–39
(stating that after the Act of Settlement, “the independence of the judges was in fact complete”); see also LYON, supra note 98, at
263 (“From the early eighteenth century, the judiciary increasingly applied and developed the law without fear or favour.”).
Raz, supra note 4, at 5; TAMANAHA, supra note 285, at 114.
Cozzi, supra note 166, at 307.
LANE, supra note 28, at 95 (“Each committee or council was checked by some other committee or council so as to assure the
rule of law . . . .”); id. at 100 (describing the duties of the Avogadori di Comun); id. at 256 (“[T]he Ten never acted entirely
alone. Regularly it had seventeen voting members, including the doge and his Councillors. It met with one of the State’s
Attorneys present, who, if he thought the Council was exceeding its authority or disobeying its statutes, could appeal the case
to the Great Council.”); see also Cozzi, supra note 166, at 307 (describing how the State Attorneys served as the “civic
conscience of the governing aristocracy” and ensured compliance with the law).
LANE, supra note 28, at 100.
WILLS, supra note 36, at 113; see also LABALME & WHITE, supra note 51, at 119 (describing a 1511 case in which the State
Attorneys argued for setting aside a criminal sentence before the Senate, upon which the Attorneys were dismissed by the Ten).
2 HAZLITT, supra note 29, at 457 (noting that among the Ten the “sternest adherence to rules and principles prevailed”); see
also WIEL, supra note 71, at 191–92 (explaining that minute regulations governed whether the Ten could hear an anonymous
accusation); NORWICH, supra note 23, at 499 (“In practice, however, abuses [by the Ten] were largely avoided by built-in
checks and balances.”); LANE, supra note 28, at 256 (stating that whenever the Ten discussed foreign affairs, the six Savii
Grandi had to attend).
LANE, supra note 28, at 256.
WIEL, supra note 71, at 189.
2 HAZLITT, supra note 29, at 443.
See BAKER, supra note 255, at 123 (stating that until the seventeenth century, the function of “controlling authority” was
regarded as a royal prerogative, generally exercised by the Privy Council).
Id. at 123.
Id. at 123–24.
KEIR, supra note 24, at 294 (“From the King downwards, every executive official derived his authority from the law.”); DICEY,
supra note 4, at 222 (“The judges . . . were invested with the means of hampering or supervising the whole administrative action of
the government, and of at once putting a veto upon any proceeding not authorised by the letter of the law.”).
DE LOLME, supra note 202, at 310.
Raz, supra note 4, at 12–13 (explaining that the rule of law helps to stop the worst forms of arbitrary power).
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corruption by maintaining precise ledgers of revenue and spending.322 Of course, the city could never live
up to its billing as a paradise of virtue. Historians have found many incidents of bribery, vote-selling, and
family influence—but this is only surprising if you credit extreme versions of the Venetian myth.323 And
such instances must be kept in perspective. In the kingdoms and principalities across Europe, nepotism
was an ordinary facet of political life. In Venice, it triggered scandal.324
Like Venetian officials before them, eighteenth-century British civil servants acquired a reputation for
honesty. In large part, this was because competence, diligence, and merit began to outweigh personal and
factional connections as the criteria for hiring and promotion.325 “Patronage” ties connected many
eighteenth-century Englishmen to one another, but these were similar to what we call “connections.”326 Men
landed government positions largely through personal recommendations; the higher the recommender’s
rank, the more valuable his word.327 Still, the system accommodated talented but unconnected aspirants,328
and no contemporary state could boast a more efficient administration.329 Later reforms cemented the rulebound character of the bureaucracy. During its imperial crescendo, Britannia ruled the waves—and much of
the world besides—with a brisk, businesslike, and no-nonsense Victorian civil service.330
In Venice and Britain, the rule of law generated wealth.331 Venice was a city of fabulous riches,
especially in its Renaissance heyday.332 Relying on strict enforcement of contracts, Venetian merchants
readily formed short-term partnerships in kaleidoscopic combinations.333 An efficient civil service
contributed as well; issuing penalties for every type of commercial trickery, thereby establishing the
Venetian brand for quality.334 Detail-oriented bureaucracies like the Board of Health regulated chimneys
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See generally 2 HAZLITT, supra note 29, at 480–81, 519–20.
MCNEILL, supra note 167, at 225 (stating that the cittadini’s “high professional morale” reinforced by “careful bookkeeping
techniques” prevented any “widespread peculation”); see also WILLS, supra note 36, at 124 (noting the skill of clerks and their
dexterity with bookkeeping).
Chojnacki, Crime, Punishment, and the Trecento Venetian State, supra note 161, at 196 (stating that Venetian officials were
generally not corrupt, but some used their positions to “line their pockets”); Everett & Queller, supra note 159, at 16
(explaining that men often sold their votes to “the highest bidder”); WILLS, supra note 36, at 144 (“Donald Queller [a historian
who undermines the ideal picture of Venice] is shocked—shocked!—to find electioneering, family pressure, fraud, and bribes
in the politics of Venice.”); LONGWORTH, supra note 31, at 175 (suggesting that Venice was in fact corrupt and did not
deserve the praise it received).
See, e.g., 1 HAZLITT, supra note 26, at 593 (describing a 1340 controversy wherein the Doge leveraged his sons into lucrative
positions); 2 HAZLITT, supra note 29, at 209, 461–69 (describing a struggle for reform in the 1620s which targeted palace
nepotism).
HOLMES & SZECHI, supra note 79, at 325–26 (explaining that eventually the British bureaucracy was successful because skill,
impartial service, and “insulation from political spoils” were accepted); see also HOLMES, supra note 259, at 257–65
(describing the principle of job security based upon competence within the eighteenth-century civil service).
EVANS, supra note 100, at 14.
Id.
Id. at 15.
HOLMES & SZECHI, supra note 79, at 326 (stating that the eighteenth-century British civil service “was the equal and probably
the superior of efficiency of any in Europe”).
KEIR, supra note 24, at 373 (explaining that parliamentary reforms begun in 1782 diminished royal influence based upon
patronage, and created a more “vigorous and businesslike spirit” in the civil service).
See, e.g., Order in the Jungle, THE ECONOMIST, March 15, 2008, at 83–85 (noting, as does a burgeoning amount of literature
today, the economic benefits of that come with a better rule of law); KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY (1997); MICHAEL JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES OF CORRUPTION: WEALTH, POWER, AND DEMOCRACY 33 (2005)
(demonstrating a strong association between poverty and corruption).
NORWICH, supra note 23, at 277–82 (detailing the rise of wealth and splendor in Venice); see also LONGWORTH, supra note
31, at 172–73 (illustrating the luxuries of the Venetian marketplace).
NORWICH, supra note 23, at 155 (noting that “mutual trust” was a distinctive feature of the Venetian merchant class, which
“easily formed short-term partnerships”).
See, e.g., 2 HAZLITT, supra note 29, at 506 (explaining the operations in the recovery of claims and in the prosecution of
fraudulent insolvents).
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and foul smells, and maintained a clean water supply.335 In England, a reliable legal environment
prepared the way for industrial takeoff. Economic historians consider eighteenth-century England—
unlike Scotland or France—“famine-proof.”336 By 1750, England was the richest nation in the world,
per person.337 The average income was ǧ12 per year, and rising rapidly. This was higher—in real
purchasing power—than many African and Asian nations in the late twentieth century.338
Venetians and Britons took pride in their rule of law. In Venice, the prow of the Doge’s barge—called
the Bucintoro—did not feature a Viking dragon, or the bronze battering ram of a Roman trireme. Instead,
there sat a golden figure of Justice, holding a sword in her right hand, but gazing upon the scales in her
left.339 For eighteenth-century Britons, legality was a point of national pride.340 The “free-born Englishman”
cliché pervaded political talk.341 Englishmen of all classes considered themselves free because they had
rights—of liberty and property—that no one could infringe.342

V.

THE ATTENUATION OF PERSONAL LOYALTIES

As a substantial body of scholarship demonstrates, personal loyalties and impersonal rules are
generally incompatible. When legal rules mediate relationships between individuals, people have less need
for, and cannot easily form, strong, diffuse, overriding relationships of personal allegiance and mutual
assistance.343
Governmental corruption (which is inversely related to the rule of law)344 is closely associated with strong
personal and factional ties.345 Within a highly corrupt state, members of particular “in-groups” (generally defined
through kinship, clan, tribal, and patronage relationships)346 receive all kinds of special advantages through their
network, but in return, they are expected to favor their “own people” whenever possible. If they are state officials
or even judges, they are essentially required (by their own people) to practice corruption.347
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2 HAZLITT, supra note 29, at 743 (explaining how Venetian health and safety regulations were framed with “extraordinary
attention to the minutest and most trifling details”).
HOLMES, supra note 259, at 257–61; see also PETER LASLETT, THE WORLD WE HAVE LOST: ENGLAND BEFORE THE
INDUSTRIAL AGE 113 (1965) (“[S]tarvation was extremely rare in England as a stated cause of death.”).
HOLMES & SZECHI, supra note 79, at 133.
Id. at 133–143; EVANS, supra note 100, at 107–9.
LABALME & WHITE, supra note 51, at 115.
Lemmings, supra note 250, at 1-2; see also BABINGTON, supra note 250, at 201 (describing the successful judicial reforms).
WINGFIELD-STRATFORD, supra note 250, at 92, 121 (1956); GILMOUR, supra note 24, at 21.
See MARCHAM, supra note 256, at 281 (explaining that the courts avowed to protect the rights of liberty and property
regardless of whether one was rich or poor); see also CORNISH & CLARK, supra note 102, at 11 (“[A]ny interference with
person or property would in principle be a legal wrong.”).
See generally Richard Sandbrook, Patrons, Clients and Factions: New Dimensions of Conflict Analysis in Africa, 5 CANADIAN
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 104, 109 (1972) (“Where a society’s impersonal legal guarantees of physical security, status,
and wealth are relatively weak or nonexistent, individuals seek personal substitutes by attaching themselves to ‘big men’
capable of providing protection and even advancement.”); ALLEN W. JOHNSON & TIMOTHY EARLE, THE EVOLUTION OF
HUMAN SOCIETIES 255 (1987) (explaining that state-formation in the later medieval period involved “the replacement of ties
of loyalty based on kinship and personal allegiance by legal, impersonal ties enforced by courts and police”); KEN JOWITT,
NEW WORLD DISORDER: THE LENINIST EXTINCTION (1992) (contrasting the “corporate,” family-centered nature of traditional
societies with the “individuated” quality of modernity); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS
IN MODERN ITALY (1993) (documenting how impersonal “civic” traditions have persisted for centuries in northern Italy, even
while life in Sicily and Naples continues to revolve around kinship and patron-client ties).
Raz, supra note 4, at 12; CAROTHERS, supra note 4, at 4; DICEY, supra note 4, at 193.
USLANER, supra note 6, at 49–50; see generally LAMBSDORFF, supra note 6, at 20–36 (analyzing the cultural conditions
associated with corruption).
LAMBSDORFF, supra note 6, at 23.
DANIEL JORDAN SMITH, A CULTURE OF CORRUPTION: EVERYDAY DECEPTION AND POPULAR DISCONTENT IN NIGERIA 65 (2007); see
generally ROBERT M. PRICE, SOCIETY AND BUREAUCRACY IN CONTEMPORARY GHANA 56–82 (1975) (illustrating the principle that,
in Ghana, family members frequently put pressure on public officials to provide corrupt benefits).
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Effective rule-of-law institutions, on the other hand, attenuate personal-loyalty relationships, and
generate an open-ended network society of relatively detached individuals. This process can be observed
historically, alongside the rise of rule-of-law institutions in both Venice and Britain. Within these states, the
rule of law evolved on different timelines, via distinct institutions, but with broadly parallel social effects.
This discussion prepares the way for the argument in Part V: that the systematic attenuation of personal
loyalties (produced by rule-of-law institutions) inhibits the formation of grand criminal conspiracies,
including those aiming at a coup d’état, and thereby produces the long-term political stability observed in
Venice, Britain, and the other “coup-free states.”
A. VENICE: “FREE AND WITHOUT FACTIONS”
Early Venice seethed with feuds and factional rancor. Our evidence for the sixth through tenth
centuries consists of endless drama; doges were deposed and blinded, and successors associated their sons in
office, attempting to establish a dynasty. Some factions leaned toward Byzantium, others favored the Franks
or Lombards, while committed republicans preferred an independent stance.348
In the centuries after 1032, as republicanism gained a permanent ascendancy, Venetians enacted many
laws to pacify kin-based rivalries.349 No family could have more than one member at a time on the Ducal
Council, the Ten, Great Council nominating committees, or other boards, so government always required
inter-clan cooperation.350
The doge’s family faced special restrictions. Like the doge, they were only supposed to accept gifts
like rose-water, leaves, and flowers.351 Promissioni required the doge, his wife, sons, grandsons, and
nephews to sell any lands they held in Venice or nearby.352 To stifle any dynastic hopes, the sons of a
Doge could barely enter politics. They might become Senators, but wielded no vote.353 In fact,
Venetians preferred doges without any wives or children.354 When bachelors assumed the ducal cap,
they swore not to marry a foreign wife without their Council’s approval.355 A doge could not even meet
with relatives unsupervised.356
Election rules calmed partisanship. Campaigning was banned; in fact, patricians were forbidden to
indicate their ambitions for office in any manner.357 As one might expect, some found this rule difficult to
follow.358 A 1497 statute condemned electioneering as inimical to “peaceful institutions”; a decade later, the
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See generally NORWICH, supra note 23, at 1–106 (detailing the unsteady setting in early Venice).
LANE, supra note 28, at 109.
Id.; Everett & Queller, supra note 159, at 4–5.
WIEL, supra note 71, at 156.
Id. at 221 (illustrating that promissioni forced all the family members to sell their land at the time of the election); NORWICH,
supra note 23, at 182 n.1 (“Fiefs – presumably in the new Venetian colonies – held by any member of his family were to be
given up within a year of his accession.”); 1 HAZLITT, supra note 26, at 676–77 (stating that all family estates must be
disposed of before one enters power).
BROWN, supra note 27, at 59–60; see also NORWICH, supra note 23, at 182 n.1 (explaining that one Doge’s Promissione
barred his sons from all great offices except ambassadorships and ship’s captaincies).
FINLAY, supra note 28, at 161 (noting that familial bonds were always perceived as a threat to liberty, and Venetian patricians
preferred a doge without sons).
NORWICH, supra note 23, at 182 n.1.
WILLS, supra note 36, at 98–99.
Everett & Queller, supra note 159, at 4 (“Any form of electioneering for office was prohibited. Patricians were even forbidden to
indicate their desire for office in any way, shape, or form.”); see also FINK, supra note 40, at 32–33 (stating that penalties for
canvassing or campaigning were severe); LANE, supra note 28, at 109 (“Rivalries were reduced also by outlawing campaigns for
office. Theoretically, the office sought the man, and anyone elected to office was required to serve.”).
Everett & Queller, supra note 159, at 17.
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Council of Ten regulated dinner parties to inhibit stealth campaigns.359 Laws even governed how people
could congratulate victors.360
Nominations by lot introduced random shuffling, making it difficult for allies to engineer outcomes.361 In the
Byzantine process for electing a doge, for example, five rounds of arbitrary culling generated the final committee,
which then drew names from an urn and voted.362 For other offices, the Great Council chose nominators by lot,
and voted on nominees during the same day, making canvassing difficult.363 During voting, nominees and their
relatives had to leave the hall.364 Secret balloting made any form of “party discipline” impossible.365
“[T]he Venetians,” wrote an anonymous London pamphleteer in 1707, “have made severe laws against
all manner of canvassing or making interest for Places. And besides, they have so contrived the way and
manner of their Elections, that they have made it almost impossible for the Electors to form themselves into
Parties for any Candidate whatsoever, because of the uncertainty to whose lot it will fall to be Candidates for
the Place. The Votes are likewise collected with so much secrecy, that it is impossible for one man to know
how another has voted.”366 Such measures, the author argued, could prevent the “intestine commotions”
which had long plagued England.367
Venetians took pains to weaken links between patrician houses and their followers. A law enacted after
Dandolo and Tiepolo gangs brawled in the streets prohibited commoners from wearing noble emblems or
coats of arms, or painting them on their houses.368 Similarly, security and police officials were barred from
having any private, economic, or familial relationships with their armed underlings.369
By all accounts, such measures worked. From the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, people saw
Venice as uniquely free of factions, and thereby tranquil.370 Bartolus de Saxoferrato, for example, was a
fourteenth-century law professor at Perugia, who thought Venetian patricians were “not easily divided
among themselves.”371 Venice avoided “internal plots” and “warring factions,” observed a Renaissance
chronicler.372 A noble diarist waxes effusively: his city seems “an earthly paradise, without any tumult of
war or suspicion of enemies” because it is “free and without factions.”373
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Stanley Chojnacki, Identity and Ideology in Renaissance Venice, in VENICE RECONSIDERED: THE HISTORY AND CIVILIZATION
263, 263–64 (John Martin & Dennis Romano eds., 2000).
Everett & Queller, supra note 159, at 4.
Id. at 4 (describing how patrician legislators sought to “neutralize the forces of faction” by using random lot drawings in the
election process).
LANE, supra note 28, at 110–11 (stating that selections by lot were expressly designed to prevent electoral campaigns, which
would inflame factions); see also NORWICH, supra note 23, at 166–67 (explaining how the ballotino had the duty of collecting
the vote slips during the lot process); see generally T. OKEY, VENICE AND ITS STORY 88–90 (1903); WIEL, supra note 71, at
165–66; 1 BROWN, supra note 27, at 304–05 (illustrating the lottery process).
Everett & Queller, supra note 159, at 16–17 (“With nominators chosen by lot [although there was occasional cheating], last
minute canvassing made political sense. There was little point in the office-seeker cultivating an enduring relationship with
any particular group of men, for they might never be nominators for the office he sought.”).
LANE, supra note 28, at 109, 259–60.
Id. at 259–60; FINK, supra note 40, at 32–33 (suggesting that it was impossible to enforce any “party discipline” because “no
one could tell how another had voted on any measure”).
FINK, supra note 40, at 181.
Id.
LANE, supra note 28, at 106–07; NORWICH, supra note 23, at 165–66.
Chojnacki, Crime, Punishment, and the Trecento Venetian State, supra note 161, at 196–97.
LANE, supra note 28, at 88 (“Another myth which, when fully formed, contributed to the solidarity of the state was a belief
that Venice was free of factions, that all worked together for the glory of their city.”); Everett & Queller, supra note 159, at 1–
2 (“According to the ‘myth’ of Venetian republicanism, the Serenissima’s treasured political stability and sobriety was assured
by the absence of faction.”); FINK, supra note 40, at 181–82 (quoting eighteenth-century writers on the absence of factions in
Venice).
LANE, supra note 28, at 114.
Tenenti, supra note 39, at 34 (quoting Lorenzo de’ Monaci).
Id. at 33 (quoting Girolamo Priuli).
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Modern historians confirm and elaborate this picture. One study examined Great Council nominations
during the 1380s.374 The investigators assumed they would find nobles consistently nominating kinfolk for
office.375 In fact, a man’s family provided no clue about his choice of nominee.376 Not only did patricians
avoid family bias, they formed no discernible factions or alliances of any sort.377 The finding undermines
any suppositions about family-based coalitions, the authors conclude, and also casts “considerable doubt on
the conjecture that certain families acted as patrons to client families.”378 The Tiepolo Rebellion in 1310,
they suggest, was the “last gasp” of traditional family solidarity.379
Ironically, kinship bonds weakened because they proliferated. Nobles intermarried, especially after the
“Great Closing” of 1297 defined their caste boundaries. Over time, kin ties within the small patrician world grew
inordinately complex, creating a dense thicket of interrelatedness.380 If everyone is family, effectively no one is.
Family never became irrelevant, of course. A family’s joint wealth shaped members’ lives. Children
frequently lived together into adulthood, worked out prospective marriages, and managed family businesses.381
Noble clans retained their pride: an insult to Ca’ Morosini—the “House of Morosini”—triggered a street fight
in 1364.382 A man might sail into elected office after his kin performed well in battle.383
Still, blood lost its power to congeal. Venetian politics—like its commerce—featured shifting,
unpredictable, and kaleidoscopic coalitions. Allies on one issue found themselves opponents or competitors
on others.384 The city presented a sharp contrast with the rest of northern Italy, where permanent “Guelph”
and “Ghibelline” factions warred. (Guelphs favored the pope, and Ghibellines backed the Holy Roman
Emperor.) These struggles barely registered in Venice.385 Historians cite a “unique spirit of cohesion and
cooperation,”386 a “comparative solidarity,”387 a “mutual dependence,”388 and a “mutual trust of a kind that
in other cities seldom extended far outside the family circle.”389 People still held animosities and grudges, of
course, but ironed out serious conflicts in the courts, Senate, and Great Council.390
A few authors approach the source of serenity. “Unable to rely on family, faction, or patrons for their
political future,” comment two specialists, “patricians were obliged to treat all their peers as potential allies,
and ingratiate themselves to everyone.”391 In this way, “individual weakness” brought collective strength.392
Frederic Lane taught at Johns Hopkins, presided at the American Historical Association, and spent decades
studying the republic.393 “The devices for the restraint of faction woven into the machinery of government
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Everett & Queller, supra note 159, at 5.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 18 (describing a “dense network of kinship” in which “the importance of any particular marriage tie in the quest for
nomination to political office was substantially diminished” because “so many could claim the privileges due to kin”).
Id. at 3; BOUWSMA, VENICE AND THE DEFENSE OF REPUBLICAN LIBERTY, supra note 23, at 66–67.
Stanley Chojnacki, In Search of the Venetian Patriciate: Families and Factions in the Fourteenth Century, in RENAISSANCE
VENICE 62 (J.R. Hale ed., 1973).
LANE, supra note 28, at 265.
Chojnacki, In Search of the Venetian Patriciate, supra note 382, at 70 (noting that social alignments cut through the great
families, which “prevented Venice from going the factional way of other Italian cities”).
Rösch, supra note 173, at 82 (“Party conflict . . . did not lead to programmatic opposition in Venice”).
NORWICH, supra note 23, at 155; see also LANE, supra note 28, at 117 (citing a “general feeling of solidarity and loyalty
among the Venetian nobility”).
LONGWORTH, supra note 31, at 150.
Everett & Queller, supra note 159, at 20.
NORWICH, supra note 23, at 155.
LANE, supra note 28, at 265.
Everett & Queller, supra note 159, at 20.
Id.
Moses Abramovitz & Richard Goldthwaite, Association Notes: In Memoriam: Frederic C. Lane 1900-1984, 46, Vol. 1 THE
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY 239–41 (1986).
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were sufficiently successful” after 1355, Lane argues, that “none of the men disappointed in the intense
competition for honors tried to overthrow the system.”394
B. BRITAIN: FROM FEUDAL LORDS TO “TEMPORARY PATRONS”
Anglo-Saxon England was a world of blood feuds and kinship solidarity, where vengeance was a
sacred duty.395 “The family bond is strong,” wrote Frederic Maitland, a renowned legal historian. “[A]n act
of violence will too often lead to a blood feud, a private war.”396 As an alternative to feuding, kin groups
could accept a wergeld payment.397 Even in the seventh century, however, royal laws encroached on the
power of families to protect their members.398
Lordship coexisted with kinship. Lords—like gang leaders or Mafia bosses—extended their
protection to kin and other neighborhood clients.399 Lords were responsible to political superiors, such
as the King, for the conduct of their dependents.400 In practice, kinship and lordship bonds swirled
together. When a lord avenged his kinsman, was he acting as “lord” or “kin?” Lordship ties frequently
brought two families into an alliance.401 If a man’s daughter married his lord’s nephew, feudal and
bloodlines grew thoroughly intermingled. Like Scottish clan chieftains, many lords governed and
protected their own kinsmen.402
Nonetheless, the rising profile of lordship and vassalage undercut kinship solidarity.403 The Norman
Conquest of 1066, as many have argued, bolstered the power of feudal lords.404 Primogeniture, or passing all
property to the first male offspring, came into widespread use after the Conquest.405 Some have argued that
primogeniture was a natural corollary of feudal relationships. To fulfill feudal obligations—to supply lords
with military manpower—vassals bestowed feoffs to a single heir.406 Primogeniture tends to weaken kinship,
because brothers assume wholly different stations.407 Still, feudalism sustained tight personal allegiances.
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LANE, supra note 28, at 271.
Robert Brentano, Introduction, in THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES, 500-1000 3, 14 (Robert Brentano ed., 1964); see also 1 POLLOCK
& MAITLAND, supra note 251, at 31 (“[A] man’s kindred are his avengers, and, as it is their right and honour to avenge him, so
it is their duty to make amends for his misdeeds, or else maintain his cause in fight.”).
Id.
Brentano, supra note 395, at 14; see also MAITLAND, supra note 254, at 4 (explaining that law makers wanted people to accept
payments instead of seeking revenge).
SIR FRANK STENTON, ANGLO SAXON ENGLAND 315–17 (3d ed. 1971).
ROBERT LACEY & DANNY DANZIGER, THE YEAR 1000: WHAT LIFE WAS LIKE AT THE TURN OF THE FIRST MILLENNIUM 48, 150
(1999) (“Power politics in the year 1000 can best be understood by observing how gangs and Mafias operate. Though
frightening to outsiders, the structure of the gang offers cohesion, protection, and a sense of belonging to the ‘family.’”); see
also Brentano, supra note 395, at 15–16 (describing the strength of the bond between man and leader).
STENTON, supra note 398, at 493.
1 BLOCH, supra note 263, at 190.
STENTON, supra note 398, at 493.
JACK GOODY, THE EUROPEAN FAMILY: AN HISTORICO-ANTHROPOLOGICAL ESSAY 48 (2000) (explaining how kinship loses
importance to lordship in Anglo-Saxon England); MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, HOMICIDE 31 (1988) (“Vassalage at least
partially replaces kinship as a basis of loyalty and power in feudal society.”); see also JACK GOODY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FAMILY AND MARRIAGE IN EUROPE 22 (1983) (describing the dissolution of extended family and clan structures during the High
Middle Ages in Spain); see generally JOHNSON & EARLE, supra note 343, at 249–56 (“Kinship was sometimes still important in
group formation, but truly tribal peoples disappeared as the warlords’ power grew.”).
1 BLOCH, supra note 263, at 272; C. Warren Hollister, 1066: The ‘Feudal Revolution,’ in THE IMPACT OF THE NORMAN
CONQUEST 109, 109–19 (C. Warren Hollister ed., 1969).
TREVELYAN, supra note 77, at 130.
TREVELYAN, supra note 77, at 130 (“After the Norman Conquest the rule of primogeniture had gradually been adopted for
land, to secure that a feoff should not be broken up among the sons of a vassal and so become unable to supply the military
service due to the lord.”); see also 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 1137 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
Ephraim Fischoff et al., trans., 1978) (“[T]he division of hereditary fiefs must be limited in the interest of their service
capacities.”).
See generally Judith J. Hurwich, Lineage and Kin in the Sixteenth Century Aristocracy: Some Comparative Evidence on
England and Germany, in THE FIRST MODERN SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN ENGLISH HISTORY IN HONOUR OF LAWRENCE STONE 33,
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Vassals were expected to aid their lord in every way, and lords oversaw vassals’ interests, such as by
providing for their widows and orphaned children.408 A ceremony—homage and fealty—sealed the bond.409
The later middle ages witnessed an attenuation of feudal relationships. With an increasingly
commercial economy,410 and a burgeoning royal government,411 the lord-vassal tie grew less total.412
Late medieval lordship, indeed, has not much in common with feudal dominium. When a man asked
another to be his ‘good lord’, he was not commending himself and his land; nor did he become anything
remotely like a vassal. Rather he was acquiring a temporary patron.413
Nevertheless, late-medieval lordship continued to derail the law. “Livery and maintenance” were great
evils to public order.414 “Livery” was a practice whereby men wore their lord’s colors, uniforms, or
emblems.415 It implied the lord’s protection against enemies, and probably emboldened wearers to break the
law.416 “Maintenance” was the support a lord gave his man in legal cases, often by corrupt methods like
bribery and intimidation.417 Livery and maintenance were not new: both practices can be traced back
centuries.418 But they aroused public fury in late-medieval England, probably because people had acquired
higher expectations for law, order, and justice.419 Justice also suffered when lords “retained”—or paid—
royal judges. Over a long period, Crown and Parliament slowly restricted such relationships. A 1346 statute
banned anyone but the King from retaining judges.420 Political pressures in the late 1300s actually curtailed
that practice.421 After 1595, lords could no longer retain local Justices of the Peace.422
The Crown reined in livery and maintenance. Statutes passed from 1399 to 1401, for example,
restricted livery to members of a lord’s household.423 The Tudors, especially through councils like Star
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43–59 (A.L. Beier, David Cannadine, & James M. Rosenbaum eds., 1989) (describing how medieval English society was
individualistic in nature because of the patrilineal system of inheritance).
Frank Barlow, The Effects of the Norman Conquest, in THE IMPACT OF THE NORMAN CONQUEST 28, 34 (C. Warren Hollister
ed., 1969).
1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 251, at 297–98.
BRITNELL, supra note 290, at 128–29.
See J.M.W. BEAN, FROM LORD TO PATRON: LORDSHIP IN LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 235–37 (1989) (describing how the role
of the Crown became more prominent from the middle of the sixteenth century forward); see also 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND,
supra note 251, at 344 (noting that crown servants were “inclined to loosen the feudal bond”).
BEAN, supra note 411, at 235–37 (illustrating that as patronage to the Crown grew, the lord-vassal bond was weakened); see
also 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 251, at 297 (explaining that homage in the thirteenth century was “but a pale
reflection of moral sentiments which are still strong but have been stronger”).
K.B. MCFARLANE, Parliament and ‘Bastard Feudalism’, in ENGLAND IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY: COLLECTED ESSAYS 1, 17–
18 (1981).
G.L. Harriss, Introduction to K.B. MCFARLANE, ENGLAND IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY: COLLECTED ESSAYS ix, x (1981); see
also K.B. MCFARLANE, Bastard Feudalism, in K.B. MCFARLANE, ENGLAND IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY: COLLECTED ESSAYS
23, 42–43 (1981) (“Livery and maintenance . . . were gradually reduced to more manageable proportions by . . . the central
authority.”).
HICKS, supra note 265, at 63.
Id.
TREVELYAN, supra note 77, at 195–96; HICKS, supra note 265, at 119.
HICKS, supra note 265, at 121; Harriss, supra note 414, at x.
See Harriss, supra note 414, at xxii (describing “local demand for more effective peace keeping” as well as complaints in
parliament of “disorder and corruption”); see also MCFARLANE, supra note 413, at 42 (“The novelty [of ‘bastard feudal’
disorder] lay in its being more talked about, denounced and legislated against. It was in fact being measured by men with a
higher conception of public order.”); see also HICKS, supra note 265, at 123 (describing increasing complaints of disorder in
the mid-thirteenth century); see also J.R. Maddicott, Law and Lordship: Royal Justices as Retainers in Thirteenth- and
Fourteenth-Century England, in 4 PAST & PRESENT SUPPLEMENT 1, 3 (1978) (“The ability of the rich and powerful to turn the
law and its ministers to their own advantage was doubtless as old as the legal system itself. . . . The novelty in the late twelfth
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Maddicott, supra note 419, at 46–48.
Id. at 80–81.
HICKS, supra note 265, at 206.
Harriss, supra note 414, at xxii–xxiii.
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Chamber, took stern measures against maintenance and judicial corruption.424 In the sixteenth century, feuds
and private wars dwindled.425
Sharp factional divisions remained at the political heights, however. Parliamentarians and royalists
warred from 1642 to 1649; 426 courtier factions reappeared under Charles II; the “Exclusion Crisis” of
1679-81 drove the political class into “Whig” and “Tory” parties;427 Whigs and Tories inhabited
separate social enclaves, eyeing each other with suspicion, during the “Rage of Party” under Queen
Anne (1702-14).428
After the Jacobite rising of 1715, treason-stained Tories went into steep decline.429 Whigs governed for
decades, and splintered into various leadership groups.430 The name “Tory” reappeared in the 1780s,431 but
by this time, the nature of partisanship had transformed. Opponents were no longer enemies, engaging in
dangerous intrigues and threatening collective retribution. Now, parties formed loosely-knit coalitions
around broad ideological positions.432 In the 1770s, Jean-Louis de Lolme perceived that “family feuds,”
“party animosities,” and the “victories and consequent outrages of factions” were “in very great measure
unknown in England.”433
The attenuation of personal loyalties is evident spatially, as well as chronologically. Strong ties
flourished in places royal justice found difficult to reach. Feuds, vendettas, and clan solidarity persisted in
the hilly and mountainous fringes of late-medieval and early modern England.434 Northern England was long
seen as a wild, clannish, and feudal backwater.435 Private feuding also disturbed Cornwall, in the hilly
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Thomas G. Barnes, The Making of English Criminal Law: Star Chamber and the Sophistication of the Criminal Law,
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW 316, 324–25 (1977); see BOWEN, supra note 75, at 107–08 (noting that great nobles in the sixteenth
century might bribe or intimidate local JPs, but exhibited a “healthy awe” of Star Chamber); see also HICKS, supra note 265, at
216 (“No less than a quarter of the cases in Star Chamber under James I involved conspiracy, maintenance, embracery and
suborning.”); see generally Dawson, supra note 263, at 172–73 (explaining the composition and the main roles of the Star
Chamber).
CHRISTOPHER HILL, REFORMATION TO INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: THE MAKING OF MODERN ENGLISH SOCIETY, 1530-1780 19–
20 (1968) (describing a reduction in private wars under the reign of the Tudors); see also PERRY ANDERSON, LINEAGES OF THE
ABSOLUTIST STATE 118–19 (1979) (explaining the successful application of royal power to prevent warfare under the Tudor
reign); see also TREVELYAN, supra note 77, at 227 (“The patient craft of Henry VII and the imperious vigor of Henry VIII had
laid the foundations of modern England. Order had been restored, the nobles and their retainers had been suppressed, royal
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generally LAWRENCE STONE, THE CRISIS OF THE ARISTOCRACY 1558-1641 12 (stating that the period 1580-1620 represents the
time when “the State fully established its authority,” and when “dozens of armed retainers were replaced by a coach, two
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HOLMES, supra note 259, at 17, 36–37.
Id. at 124–31.
Id. at 334.
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R. L. STOREY, THE END OF THE HOUSE OF LANCASTER 8 (London: Barrie & Rockliff, 1966) (“The feuds of the nobility in the
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nature of society” in Northern England and how southern English folk believed the North to be a “strange and wild world”);
see also HICKS, supra note 265, at 82–83 (describing the feudal system in Northern England); see also Storey, supra note 434,
at 106 (“The problem of keeping order in the north [of England] . . . remained until the end of the sixteenth century.”); but see
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southwest.436 Mountainous Wales was infamous for “chronic lawlessness.”437 The Scottish Highlands
remained clannish and disorderly into the mid-eighteenth century.438 And of course, the last coup attempt in
British history came in 1745-46, when Highland chiefs brought their clansmen to fight under the banner of
Stuart rebellion.439

VI.

ATTENUATED LOYALTIES AND THE INHIBITION OF COUP CONSPIRACIES

This Article proposes the following theory to explain long-term political stability in the “coup-free
states.” By systematically weakening personal-loyalty relationships throughout the political-military
establishment, the rule of law makes it inordinately difficult to assemble a grand criminal conspiracy aimed
at the seizure of state power. When personal loyalties are strong, especially when those ties involve corrupt
relationships, it is relatively safe for members of the same “in-group” to propose, discuss, and plan a new
criminal enterprise.440 The suggestion may be considered and refused, or even dismissed out of hand, but the
person offering the idea is unlikely to be turned in to the authorities. There are two main reasons for this:
first, members of the same faction trust each other more than they trust “outsiders” who hold other state
offices;441 and second, participants within a “corruption clique” could always retaliate by disclosing the
criminal activities of their comrades.442 Moreover, even a large-scale conspiracy can be achieved, with
perhaps only a few risky communications between different factions or cliques.
But in the absence of tightly-knit solidarity groups, crossing the threshold into a criminal
solicitation or conspiracy (especially involving a serious felony such as treason) becomes fraught with
peril. Under the rule of law, with systematically attenuated personal loyalties, people recognize the
difficulties of assembling a conspiracy large enough to mount a coup d’état. At an implicit level, at
least, people understand that if a member of the political-military establishment were approached about
joining a coup conspiracy, he would, by balancing risks and rewards, almost certainly choose to disclose
the plot to the authorities, rather than wholeheartedly join the conspirators.443 After all, if someone is
eventually going to betray the plot, it might as well be oneself; otherwise, one runs a severe risk of
being associated with treason. This is why even the first steps towards a coup conspiracy—overtures or
proposals from one person to another, about using force to seize political power—appear to be
exceedingly rare in rule-of-law states.
This section proceeds in the following six steps. First, it examines the coup d’état as a practical
operation, requiring at least dozens, and more likely hundreds, of individual participants. Second, it shows
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CHARLES ROSS, EDWARD IV 407 (1974).
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589, 589 (1968); see also 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 251, at 224 (describing how wergild persisted in thirteenth-century
Wales); see generally ROSS, supra note 436, at 407–08 (exemplifying some of the defiant Welsh clans).
TREVELYAN, supra note 77, at 391 (citing the “warlike organization of the tribes and the extra-legal allegiance to the chiefs” in
Scotland); ANDERSON, supra note 425, at 136–37 (noting the continuing strength of lordship, and the persistence of feuding, in
Scotland though the sixteenth century); HOLMES, supra note 259, at 21 (noting the “feudal” characteristics of eighteenthcentury Scotland); see also HOLMES & SZECHI, supra note 79, at 218 (“Only after 1780 did economic criteria (i.e. how much
rent they would pay) begin to play a major role in the relationship between most [Scottish] landlords and their tenants. Until
then putative kinship, prolonged residence and the memory of ancient services rendered was at least as important.”).
See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
See USLANER, supra note 6, at 49 (“Corruption, of course, depends upon trust – or ‘honor among thieves.’”).
Id. at 49–50 (“Entrance into a corruption network is not easy. Members of a conspiracy of graft cannot simply assume that
others are trustworthy . . . . [C]orruption thrives on particularized trust, where people only have faith in their own kind (or their
own small circle of malefactors) . . . . Clientelism reinforces strong in-group ties and hostility toward out-groups, paving the
way for corruption.”).
See Lambsdorff, supra note 6, at 21 (explaining that partners in corruption are at the mercy of each other and constantly must
fear being outed by their colleagues).
See Luttwak, supra note 15, at 75 (describing the motivation for reporting a coup plot to the authorities: “[t]he natural thing
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how personal-loyalty relationships are central to the organization of coups, as well as to the general
phenomenon of corruption. Third, it presents two hypothetical scenarios, designed to pinpoint the obstacles
to coup conspiracies under rule-of-law conditions. Fourth, it offers anecdotal evidence suggesting that within
rule-of-law states, it is exceedingly difficult (and rare) for high-ranking officials to even suggest a coup
d’état. Fifth, it explains how rule-of-law institutions inhibit popular revolutions as well as elite-led coups.
Sixth, it applies a statistical test: if rule-of-law institutions inhibit coups d’état, and if the rule of law
necessarily entails minimal corruption, we would expect to find that stable or “coup-free” states exhibit
particularly low levels of corruption. In fact, as we will find, the correlation between stability and low
corruption is robust. Coups and corruption go together, because both emanate from the same basic source:
relationships of personal loyalty that undermine, subvert, and defeat impersonal rules.
A. PLANNING AND EXECUTING A COUP D’ÉTAT
What allows a relatively small, subordinate minority to overthrow established leaders? Edward
Luttwak is an entertainingly blunt, Romanian-born defense intellectual. In his classic study—Coup d’État: A
Practical Handbook—Luttwak details the basic strategy.444 Coup organizers seize critical government445 and
communications446 facilities, and instantly publicize their victory in order to dissuade challenges.447 In other
words, they race to make their new order a fait accompli.
In Luttwak’s presentation, coups are complex games, based ultimately upon bluff, psychology, and
momentum. Luttwak considers, for example, how a coup d’état appears from the perspective of an ordinary
soldier, loyal to the existing leadership. As the coup gets under way, this soldier may notice some odd or unusual
events, but continues performing his job.448 He might even fire his weapon at “rebel” units. At some point,
though, enough evidence may accumulate to convince him that someone else is now in charge. Perhaps the
presidential palace is in flames, and a new government is announcing itself over the radio. At that point, loyalists
like him can feel isolated. Numerically, they may constitute a majority, but have no way of knowing that fact,
communicating with each other, or combining efforts. Rather than fight the new regime by themselves, scattered
loyalists may accept what appears inevitable, and declare their support.449 As they do, the coup gains momentum.
Every successful coup d’état passes a “tipping point,” after which it becomes nearly irresistible.
Coordination is critical. Each coup participant must take drastic and highly criminal steps—like leading
an armed assault against major government facilities—and hope that coconspirators execute their missions.
Only a unitary, sudden, and overwhelming onslaught will convince the security forces and mass public to
fold. While it is difficult to pinpoint the exact number of people required to stage a coup, the number appears
to be in the hundreds.450 Just as a blitz intimidates regimes and their loyalists, it also misleads observers.
Academics and journalists routinely discuss coups as essentially bureaucratic maneuvers, whereby “the
military” decides to “intervene in politics.”451 This apparently sophisticated locution vastly overstates the
degree of coordination and consensus. Tellingly, this single-actor narrative is rarely used when coups fail,
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LUTTWAK, supra note 15, passim.
Id. at 128 (noting that the “need to provide the bureaucracy and the masses with visual evidence of the reality and power of the
coup” can make it critical to seize symbolically important public buildings).
See id. at 118 (describing how “control over the flow of information emanating from the political centre” is the most important
way for coup organizers to establish their authority).
Id. at 168 (noting that one of the main reasons for controlling the media is to “discourage resistance”).
Id. at 150 (“When army officers find themselves doing unusual things, their natural reaction is to try and fit them into familiar
patterns; the most familiar pattern of all will be to arrive at the conclusion that the ‘politicians are guilty of yet another
‘mess’.’”).
See id. at 168 (explaining that a major obstacle to active resistance is created when individual opponents are isolated, “cut off
from friends and associates,” and prevented from hearing news about other resistance); id. at 122–23 (noting that road blocks
can delay the arrival of loyalist military forces until coup organizers have “received the allegiance of the bulk of the state
bureaucracy and military forces,” which turns the loyalist forces into an “isolated band of rebels”).
See DAVID HEBDICH & KEN CONNOR, HOW TO STAGE A MILITARY COUP: FROM PLANNING TO EXECUTION (2008).
NORDLINGER, supra note 236, passim.
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because in those cases, it is usually obvious that some armed forces resisted the coup. Roughly half of all
coups go down in flames.452 Even when conspirators prevail, this model is hopelessly inaccurate. Every
coup is a miniature, chaotic, and unpredictable civil war.
B. COUPS, CORRUPTION, AND TRUST
Trust and strong personal relationships are essential to organizing a coup d’état. Luttwak acknowledges
that “friendship” and a “shared political outlook” can foster conspiracies, but finds recruitment usually based
upon “family, clan and ethnic links.”453 Bruce Farcau worked as a U.S. Foreign Service Officer, and
experienced two coups while stationed in Bolivia. “It is my opinion,” he writes, “that personal ambition of
individual officers and the subsequent struggle of the factions which form around the most charismatic ones
have far greater relevance than most social theorists have recognized.”454 Samuel Decalo describes the
typical African army as “a coterie of distinct armed camps,” where soldiers owe personal allegiance to
commanders, and coup plotters are motivated by “ambition, fear, greed, and vanity.”455 Africans themselves
do not interpret coups as coordinated military actions, he comments, but rather the spectacular emergence of
certain factions to power and privilege.456 Coup leaders frequently offer high-minded justifications—like
corruption or poor economic performance—but Decalo is skeptical.457 Often, new regimes prove just as
corrupt as their predecessors. In fact, Decalo detects a close connection between corruption and coups d’état.
No leader, he points out, can afford to antagonize officers “intent at social plunder” who are “backed by
personal loyalty pyramids.”458
Personal loyalties are central to coup conspiracies, but also to the phenomenon of corruption more
generally. As a bureaucrat in Ghana reported, if a man refused to “fix” things for family members, he
“would be regarded as a bad man and members of the family might refuse to have anything to do with him
again.”459 “Even if I wanted to avoid the practice of awarding contracts on the basis of favoritism,” a
Nigerian official has commented, “I could not. My people would say that I am selfish and foolish.”460 The
causal arrow goes both ways: personal relationships foster corruption, while corruption builds personal trust.
For example, when customs officials accept bribes from drug smugglers (an obvious temptation and a
common problem), they are committing serious crimes. In Mexico and Colombia, for example, warlords buy
police officials and judges, effectively recruiting them into their private armies.461 In order to avoid criminal
prosecution in turn, corrupt officials may need to share the proceeds with coworkers, supervisors, or law
enforcement agents.462 Offering a bribe—especially to an unfamiliar party—is risky. The other party can
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report the incident or demand more. Once a regular pattern of sharing illicit dividends arises, though, the
danger ebbs, because each partner has exposed himself to criminal sanctions. At this point, the “insiders”
share a common danger and purpose, and try to keep “outsiders” at bay.463
C. COST-BENEFIT CALCULATIONS: TWO HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIOS
Coups are difficult and perilous in any setting. In rule-of-law societies with systematically weakened
personal-loyalty relationships, individual cost-benefit considerations make it practically impossible to
organize a coup d’état.
We might consider a hypothetical scenario: one senior U.S. Army officer (“General #1”) approaches
another (“General #2”) about using military force to depose the President. How would General #2 respond? Even
if he finds the President politically objectionable, his personal interests militate against entering a conspiracy.
On the one hand, the dangers are self-evident. This could be a setup, just to test his loyalty. Even if the
solicitation is genuine, the obstacles to success would seem enormous, verging on insurmountable. After all,
this is not Haiti, Thailand, or Equatorial Guinea, but the United States of America, where no one has ever
attempted a coup! Who knows if it could actually work? Even in unstable states, coups fail about as often as
they succeed. To have any chance, Generals #1 and #2 would have to enlist many other officers, including
field-level commanders, any of whom could betray the plot.
Supposing the plan worked, then what? Presumably, General #2 would play some prominent role in the
new regime. But how long would it last? Outrage within the public, political establishment, and nonparticipating military forces might spark a swift counterrevolution. Or, the new junta might govern for a
period, only to lose their grip later. Through any number of routes, General #1 and General #2 could find
themselves court-martialed and punished as traitors. Conceivably, of course, Generals #1 and #2 could
govern brilliantly and usher in a golden age, and posterity might add their heads to Mount Rushmore. But
for this to happen, a lot has to go perfectly, and almost nothing can go wrong. Taking all the risks into
account, the case for entering a conspiracy appears dubious at best.
On the other hand, consider the alternative: General #2 could simply report General #1. By foiling the
plot and preserving democracy, General #2 will probably enjoy a period of media stardom and, potentially, a
bright political future: he might easily find himself on the short list for President or Vice-President. This
road to power is much straighter, while incurring few if any risks.
Viewed in this light, it appears wondrous that anyone pulls off a coup d’état. And yet, a drumbeat of
coups persists around the globe. The crucial factors are personal trust and the closely related power to derail
justice. Consider two other military leaders, General A and General B. If they are brothers, cousins, old
friends, or patron-client, they are more likely to collaborate. If Generals A and B are skimming money from
military procurement contracts, each is less likely to inform the authorities about any matter, because the
other could easily retaliate by disclosing everything. If General A is a “warlord” or “big man,” controls a
private army of loyalists, poses a clear threat to anyone who crosses him, and can bribe or threaten judges,
no one will lightly betray his confidence. The more such conditions apply, the more likely General B would
go along, if General A begins talking about a coup d’état.
D. CONSPIRACIES AND SOLICITATION EPISODES
Fortunately, we are not limited to hypothetical scenarios and thought experiments to probe the
difficulties of organizing a coup under rule-of-law conditions. Under the theory presented in this Article, we
might imagine that over a long period of time, certain individuals would still be tempted to propose a coup,
particularly during moments of national or personal crisis. If so, how did they go about it, and what
happened? Does such evidence support or contradict our theory?
We find three telling vignettes from the histories of coup-free states. A short-lived coup conspiracy
appeared in Venice in the early fifteenth century, and in the United States, we can identify two
463

See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.

WEAK LOYALTIES

79

interesting “solicitation episodes,” in which senior officials appear to be suggesting, proposing, or
insinuating a coup d’état. (This discussion does not purport to present a complete list of conspiracies
and “solicitation episodes” within coup-free states. From all indications, however, such events appear to
be rare.)
The first episode took place in Venice in 1413.464 (This was 103 years after the last Venetian coup
attempt, and 58 years after the major conspiracy of 1355.) Two rich commoners, named D’Anselmo and
Baldovino, tried to get themselves ennobled.465 (Through a seldom-used procedure, men could be elected
into the nobility and Great Council.) After failing, the two men vented their frustrations to each other, and
their talk turned treasonous. D’Anselmo and Baldovino agreed to organize their followers, and in two days,
to massacre the nobles emerging from the Great Council.466 After they parted, D’Anselmo panicked.
Hearing his words echoing in his ears, he agonized about possible eavesdroppers and decided there was only
one way to save himself.467 He went straight to the authorities and spilled the whole story.468 They seized
Baldovino, tortured him, and at eight o’clock the next morning, executed him. D’Anselmo, the informer,
was pardoned and ennobled.469
The second episode took place during the U.S. Civil War, when General George McClellan
apparently contemplated opposing President Lincoln by force. A Democrat, McClellan commanded the
largest Union army in the East.470 Newspapers called him “Young Napoleon” because of his physical
resemblance and magnetic hold over soldiers.471 “By some strange operation of magic,” McClellan
wrote in the summer of 1861, “I seem to have become the power of the land. I almost think that were
I to win some small success now, I could become Dictator or anything else that might please me—but
nothing of that kind would please me—therefore I won’t be Dictator.”472
After the Emancipation Proclamation in September 1862, opposition to Lincoln among certain
Northerners grew virulent. Racists were particularly incensed.473 Democratic groups like the “Knights of the
Golden Circle”474 and the “Sons of Liberty”475 murmured about forcing an end to the war. Republicans
called them “Copperheads.”476
At this time, General McClellan invited three fellow generals to dinner. He told them that his admirers
were urging him to take a public stand against emancipation, and that his troops were ready to follow.477 The
generals were shocked. They pleaded with him to avoid any confrontation with the President, and told him
that no soldier would stand by him.478 McClellan agreed, but may have been probing their attitudes.479
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A few weeks later, General McClellan was relieved of command, and his career took a thoroughly
constitutional course.480 McClellan won the Democratic nomination for President in 1864, promising to
negotiate with the Confederacy. In a purely Northern election, Lincoln won in a landslide.481
The third episode occurred in the 1970s. During the Watergate crisis, rumors circulated around
Washington that President Nixon might call on the military for support against impeachment.482 Nixon may
have contemplated the idea, but the evidence is sketchy.
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt described an alarming meeting between President Nixon and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in December 1973. Nixon launched into a “big rambling monologue,” reported Zumwalt, about how “the
Eastern liberal establishment was out to do us all in.” Nixon’s next suggestion was shocking. “We gentlemen
here,” declared the President, “are the last hope, the last chance to resist . . . .”483 Zumwalt recalled:
I got the impression, he was sort of testing the water with us, to see whether there would be
support—any nodding of heads—at some of these things. One could well have come to the
conclusion that here was the Commander-in-Chief trying to see what the reaction of the Chiefs
might be if he did something unconstitutional . . . . He was trying to find out whether in a crunch
there was support to keep him in power.484
Stunned, Admiral Zumwalt conferred with Army General Creighton Abrams. Abrams said he would
act as though the episode never occurred.485
If Zumwalt’s depiction is accurate, President Nixon appears to have floated a trial balloon, to see
whether the military brass would support him in a coup d’état. Like McClellan, however, Nixon remained
cagey and ambiguous, so as to give him plausible deniability. In both cases, the trial balloons popped
instantly, and both men backed away.
These episodes are consistent with the theory presented here. The anecdote from Venice illustrates how
risk-reward calculations under rule-of-law systems promote the disclosure of coup conspiracies to relevant
authorities. The “solicitation episodes” from the United States demonstrate that high-ranking officials are
not so uniformly virtuous that they refuse to contemplate an extra-constitutional adventure. Instead, officials
cannot orchestrate a coup d’état because they fear to raise the topic in conversation.
E. AVERTING POPULAR UPRISINGS
This theory also explains the absence of spontaneous mass revolutions. Like any other coup plotters,
street revolutionaries must attract followers, and face the same trust dilemmas. Moreover, revolutionaries
appear heroic—and galvanize imitators—when they sacrifice their own safety to oppose a monstrous
regime. After weathering decades of grim surveillance, for example, Eastern Europeans poured into the
streets during the fall of 1989. Sheer numbers inspired hope, creating momentum. When portions of the
security services refused to crack down, the regimes stepped aside. Humane governments under the rule of
law, however, do not kindle sufficient outrage. Instead, they make revolutionaries seem dangerous. It is not
credible to most people that the revolutionary overthrow of a legitimate rule-of-law government would
enhance their safety or well-being. In established democracies, the closest parallels to insurrectionary
violence are urban riots, like those that burned in Los Angeles in 1992 and Paris in 2005. Many such
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episodes involve racial minorities, who feel aggrieved by systemic bias in the justice system. These rioters
make cities momentarily ungovernable, but have no chance of toppling governments, partly because
majority populations do not share their grievances.
Aside from public apathy, mass revolutions are impossible because no civilians—no matter how
angry or militant—can effectively challenge the immense power of a united political-military
establishment. Nineteenth-century British agitators, for example, simply lacked the organization or
firepower to challenge the state.486 Popular revolutions, as many have argued, require factional divisions
within the security forces. According to Lenin, “no revolution of the masses can triumph without the
help of a portion of the armed forces.”487 A study of fifteen mass rebellions found that disloyalty and
fragmentation within the security apparatus was critical for success.488 Unless the security forces divide,
they can contain civilian unrest.
F. TESTING THE THEORY
If the theory articulated in this Article is correct (that rule-of-law institutions systematically attenuate
personal-loyalty relationships within the military-political establishment, thereby inhibiting the formation of
criminal conspiracies, up to and including a coup d’état), we would expect to find that states exhibiting longterm stability would also exhibit low levels of corruption. Transparency International (“TI”), a Berlin-based
think tank, ranks countries by their levels of governmental corruption, as perceived by country analysts and
business people.489 (Corruption cannot be measured directly, because it is an illicit and generally secretive
behavior. The TI Corruption Index probably represents the best method for measuring relative corruption
rates around the world.) The following page shows the 2008 Corruption Index, from the highest perceived
corruption to the lowest perceived corruption.490 The 22 “coup-free states”—the states that experienced no
coups or serious coup attempts from 1961 through 2010491—are in bold.
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As we can see, most of the coup-free states are clustered at the very bottom of the corruption index.
Moreover, only coup-free states appear there. (Singapore, which has experienced no coups or coup attempts,
has not yet experienced fifty years of independence; Hong Kong has never been independent.)
Admittedly, the correlation between corruption and coups is not absolutely perfect. Four coup-free
states have somewhat higher corruption scores: Israel, Costa Rica, South Africa, and Mexico. Notably, these
states are recent entrants to what we might call the “coup-free zone.” South Africa gained independence
from Great Britain in 1934;492 Mexico saw a final coup attempt in 1938;493 Israel experienced one coup
attempt in 1948, shortly after independence;494 and Costa Rica’s last coup attempt came in 1955.495 Costa
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Rica, South Africa, and Mexico, moreover, are the most tenuous coup-free states. During the past fifty years,
coup plots have been rumored in Mexico496 and Costa Rica,497 and black South Africans agitated for
revolutionary change—but made no overt, highly plausible attempts to seize power.498 In 1994, South
Africa’s white oligarchy peacefully relinquished power.499 If any of these 22 stable states revert to coups, it
will almost certainly be Mexico, Costa Rica, or South Africa.
Still, the relationship between corruption and coups is strong. Is it sheer coincidence? The
following chi-square test assesses this possibility.500 This table only includes the states that have
remained fully independent from 1961 through 2010, and thus potential coup-free states. If coups and
corruption were not associated, we would expect the coup-free states in the second column to be
distributed roughly evenly between the high-corruption and low-corruption boxes, as the “states with
coup events” are. Instead, all of them are in the low-corruption box, and the odds of this pattern arising
by chance are less than 1 in 10,000.
As we can see, corruption and coups are closely associated. They both derive from the same basic
source: relationships of personal trust and allegiance that weaken, warp, and defeat impersonal rules.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Most Serene Republic astonished the world, and British tranquility has provoked similar
perplexity. As Jean-Louis de Lolme asked in 1791, what is the “secret force” keeping Britain stable?501 The
mystery remains palpable, and now extends to a couple of dozen states around the world.502
The standard answer—internalization of professional military values—is weak. This theory places
enormous weight on the ephemeral capacities for selfless generosity and public spirit. Virtue theory requires
a perfect education, instilled throughout the leadership classes, that counteracts basic self-interest, and
persists for centuries. Moreover, it simply pushes the explanation back another level: why have the militaries
of Venice, Britain, and the United States internalized “professional” norms, but the militaries of Honduras,
Pakistan, and Guinea, among many others, have failed to do so?
A better answer is that the rule of law systematically attenuates personal loyalties, making coup
conspiracies inordinately difficult to organize. Within rule-of-law states, a collective action problem inhibits
the formation of nascent coup conspiracies within the military-political establishment. Within a rule-of-law
state, it is unlikely that any official will dare approach even one other official about a coup d’état. As a
practical matter, the idea disappears: it grows outlandish and absurd. No one can alter this dynamic, and
constitutional government persists for decades and centuries.

501
502

DE LOLME, supra note 202, at 436.
See Karsten, supra note 218, at 155 (“Call it socialization or tradition, something has been at work in certain competitive
democracies to preclude military coups.”).

